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Lawyer Role, Agency Law, and the
Characterization "Officer of the Court"
JAMES A. COHENt
The law of agency has governed American lawyers since
before the Revolution, but recent scholarship about legal
ethics and professional role almost entirely ignores it. Most
commentators would concede that attorneys are agents, but
would quickly add that the lawyer is also an "officer of the
court" who has obligations to seek justice. However,
analysis of the phrase "officer of the court" reveals that it
has surprisingly little content; it is mostly rhetoric, caused
by self-love and self-promotion. What little content it has
points to a role of the attorney as agent whose obligations to
the court are almost identical to those owed by non-lawyers
and almost entirely consistent with duties to clients.
By largely ignoring agency law, and failing to throughly
examine the attorney's role as an "officer of the court,"
commentators have mistakenly grounded wide ranging
arguments that lawyers must seek "justice" because they
are officers of the court who have a special obligation to
seek justice. Indeed, they argue that the lawyer's duty to
seek justice is superior to the obligation of loyalty and
zealous advocacy on behalf of the client. In their view, there
are situations in which the lawyer's duty as an "officer of
the court" empowers her to disobey the client's lawful
instructions because following them would not promote
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justice. Proponents of this "moral activist" role have
overlooked or misapprehended the importance of agency
law and uncritically exaggerated the role of lawyer as an
"officer of the court." Acceptance of their arguments would,
moreover, profoundly change the attorney's role from that
of agent for a client to that of agent for 'justice." This would
create a system that would allow the lawyer to substitute
her moral beliefs for her client's lawful instructions.
As it applies to the representation of clients, analysis of
the characterization "officer of the court" reveals that the
term consists of process obligations which are wholly
consistent with fundamental principles of agency law-
including the duty of zealous advocacy. Therefore, in our
adversary system the lawyer's duty to the court is almost
entirely harmonious with the lawyer's duty as agent for her
client.
Lawyers do perform a screening or gate-keeping
function for the courts, society, and clients. Allegations or
responses that are without foundation may not be made.
Courts, therefore, have some-assurance that complaints and
defenses have some merit. However, non-lawyers are also
prohibited from making claims or asserting defenses that
are without merit, thus, lawyers do not have a special, or
unique gate-keeping role.
Moreover, there is little historical support for the
existence of a lawyer's substantive duty to seek justice that
would trump the duties of loyalty and obedience to clients.
As early as the 13th century, in medieval England,
attorneys were considered "officers of the courts"; but this
role did not impose responsibilities on attorneys that were
inconsistent with duties owed to clients or different than
the obligations to the legal system borne by non-lawyers.
Essentially, attorneys were prohibited from engaging in
criminal conduct. While not perfectly clear, the history in
ancient Greece and the Roman Empire does not suggest
that those performing as lawyers (or an aspect of the
lawyer's role as in Greece) owed any obligations to the
courts or society that were at odds with duties owed to
clients or different than duties of ordinary citizens. There is
considerably more information available in America-and
thus more room for dispute. Nevertheless, an examination
of our history reveals the source of the empty and self-
serving rhetoric. History also shows that the lawyer's
controlling role identity is as an agent whose duties to the
350 [Vol. 48
"OFFICER OF THE COURT"
court, or to seek justice, are almost entirely process oriented
and compatible with the duties owed to clients.
Agency law is the proper framework for analyzing
lawyer role because it offers a rich well-established
structure for understanding and determining attorney role
and professional ethics and is grounded in a long and
established history. Attorneys are nonemployee, or
independent contractor, agents, who are engaged by
principals seeking their discretion, expertise, judgment, and
skill. The agent's duty of obedience requires that the
instructions of the principal regarding goals or objectives of
the agency relation be followed. The duty of obedience is not
absolute. Agents have the discretion to select the means to
accomplish client objectives. Under some circumstances,
agents may decline to follow instructions that interfere with
attainment of the client's goals or are unlawful. Consistent
with agency principles, attorney ethics codes may be best
understood as the expression of collective wisdom on the
exercise of the attorney-agent's discretion. The fact that
lawyers are agents reinforces the conclusion that the
concept "officer of the court" does not include a substantive
duty to seek justice independent of the duty of loyalty owed
to clients.
This article will demonstrate that agency law provides
a sound framework for examining even the most vexing
ethical and role issues. In particular, the role issues at the
junction of zealous advocate and "officer of the court" are
explored. In Part I, the concept "officer of the court" is
examined to determine its content. The attempt by
prominent commentators to ground a substantive duty to
seek justice in the lawyer's role as an "officer of the court" is
noted and then critically examined from a historical and
modern perspective. The 19th century writers David
Hoffman, and George Sharswood, considered the father of
legal ethics, are scrutinized. Then, attorney as an "officer of
the court" in medieval England, the Roman Empire, and
Greece is briefly discussed.
In Part II, agency law and the role of the lawyer as
agent will be discussed. A short historical excursion to
ancient Greece, Rome, and England will be taken to show
the role of the lawyer as agent in those societies. We will
discover that common to all three societies is a role in which
an individual assists a party in legal proceedings at the
party's direction. Finally, Part III, examines agency law to
2000] 351
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determine if it can provide content to the label "officer of
the court." Also discussed in Part III is whether the
lawyer's role within our adversary system should ever
include a substantive duty to the court to seek justice that
is inconsistent with the duty of client loyalty.
I. THE CHARACTERIZATION "OFFICER OF THE COURT"
A. Introduction'
A major component of the attorney's role is defined by
her right to appear in court on the behalf of clients.
Because of admission, regulation, and role, lawyers are part
of the justice system; as licensed participants they are
universally considered "officers of the court."' Only lawyers
are privileged to practice in court on behalf of others and,
therefore, must bear certain obligations.4 By virtue of the
privilege of practicing in the courts, lawyers support the
administration of justice.5
1. At the outset, it is important to acknowledge that attorneys have always
filled many roles other than the representation of private clients. In these roles,
attorneys have made substantial contributions to the justice system in
particular and society in general. Lawyers serve as community and government
leaders in legislatures, executive offices, and of course, the judiciary. Lawyers
also play significant law reform roles in bar associations. But in these roles the
lawyer is not obligated by duties to clients and is thus free to contribute in any
way seen fit. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 6.4 cmt. (1983)
(stating that lawyers participating in law reform work must protect the
integrity of program by disclosure if interests of private client would be
materially benefitted) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
2. "Clients" refers to non-governmental clients. Most clients will not want to
become (or remain) clients if their cause has too little merit and thus a gate-
keeping function benefits them. For individuals who wish to proceed despite the
absence of merit the short answer is that neither clients or attorneys may
utilize non-meritorious claims or responses. See infra notes 178-89 and
accompanying text.
3. See In re Integration of Nebraska State Bar Ass'n, 275 N.W. 265, 268
(Neb. 1937); see also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assoc., 436 U.S. 447, 460 (1978)
("[L]awyers are essential to the primary governmental function of
administering justice, and have historically been 'officers of the courts' [and] act
as trusted agents of their clients.").
4. In some jurisdictions and substantive areas of law, non-lawyers are
permitted to appear before administrative tribunals and courts as lay
advocates. For example, in certain hearings in the benefits area petitioners are
permitted to be represented by non-lawyers and in applications for protection
orders lay advocates often appear.
5. See In re Integration of Nebraska State Bar Ass'n, 275 N.W. at 268.
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Few have scrutinized the label "officer of the court"
carefully, let alone from a scholarly perspective.' However,
it is common currency in the speeches of Bar Leaders, Law
Day presentations,' memorials to prominent lawyers and
judges, and judicial opinions. Considering that all attorney
conduct is subject to court review8 and the disciplinary
authority of the court,9 attorneys could be acting in their
role as "officers of the court" at all times. Such a broad
conceptualization, however, gives little body to the phrase.
Lawyers have certain duties to their clients that do not
directly involve courts,' ° duties to courts or tribunals that do
not directly involve clients," and duties as citizens. More
productively, the range of attorney's duties can be broken
down into three categories: (1) duties to courts, (2) duties to
clients, and (3) duties to others. 2
The image of lawyer as loyal and zealous client
protector 3 (also bedeviled by its own rhetoric) 4 is normally
6. Professor Gaetke is an exception. See Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers as
Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39 (1989).
7. See Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1,
13 (1988) [hereinafter Gordon, Independence] (stating that when lawyers talk
about "public duties, being officers of the court and so on, most of us understand
that we have left ordinary life far behind for the hazy aspirational world of the
Law Day sermon and Bar Association after-dinner speech-inspirational,
boozily solemn, anything but real").
8. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 8.4(d) (stating that a lawyer
has committed professional misconduct by acting in a way that is prejudicial to
the administration of justice); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
DR 5-102(A)(5) (1969) [hereinafter MODEL CODE].
9. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 8.5 (stating that a lawyer is
subject to the disciplinary authority of jurisdiction where admitted).
10. See, e.g., id. Rule 2.2 (lawyer as intermediary). In addition, lawyers
serve as advisors in a variety of transactional settings normally having nothing
to do with courts.
11. Id.; see, e.g., id. Rule 8.3 (discussing duty to report professional
misconduct).
12. Cf. MODEL RULES, supra note 1, preamble. See generally infra notes 163,
172, 173, 187-95 and accompanying text.
13. In what has become the archetypical description of loyalty and zealous
advocacy, Lord Henry Brougham described this view of the lawyer's role in
connection with his defense of Queen Caroline:
[An advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all
the world, and that person is his client. To save the client by all means
and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and,
among them, to himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing
this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction
which he may bring upon others. Separating the duty of a patriot from
that of an advocate, he must go on reckless of the consequences, though
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juxtaposed against rhetoric about attorneys as "officers of
the court," leaving attorneys not knowing which master to
serve and when. Tension is said to exist because zealous
advocacy on behalf of clients on occasion conflicts with the
lawyer's responsibilities to the court and the public." When
there is a conflict, the attorney's duty as an "officer of the
court" trumps the lawyer's duty to the client." Attempts to
reconcile the purported conflict between zealous advocacy
and the duty to the court to seek justice has absorbed
commentators on professional role for many years. 7
Discovering the meaning of the concept and separating it
it be his unhappy fate to involve his country in confusion.
2 TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 8 (J. Nightingale ed. 1821).
14. Lord Henry Brougham's famous statement has generated a mountain of
rhetoric in favor and against. Professor Monroe H. Freedman is probably his
most prolific and outspoken adherent. See generally MONROE H. FREEDMAN,
UNDERSTANDING LAwYERs' ETHICS 1 (1990); Monroe H. Freedman, Professional
Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64
MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966). Opponents include, inter alia, M.H. Hoeflich, Legal
Ethics in the 19th Century: The "Other Tradition," 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 793, 795
(1999) (claiming that Lord Brougham's oft repeated statement was "the most
extreme view to that point ever expounded"). Dean Hoeflich further claims that
Brougham's view was "contradictory to the medieval tradition of legal ethics,"
inconsistent with Blackstone's view, and in the United States "attacked [by]
contemporaries and successors as being utterly inappropriate." Id.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to evaluate these claims because we are not
referred to any authoritative source other than one reference to Sharswood who
is first slightly critical of Lord Brougham's statement but quickly qualifies his
criticism. See SHARSWOOD, infra note 90, at 87.
15. See Gaetke, supra note 6, at 40-41 (noting that there are "two
antagonistic models" of the role of lawyer in our system: (1) the lawyer as
zealous advocate, "the devoted champion of the client's cause," and (2) as
officers of the court); Robert W. Gordon, The Ethical Worlds of Large-Firm
Litigators: Preliminary Observations, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 709, 728 (1998)
[hereinafter Gordon, Ethical Worlds] (claiming that lawyers understood the
"zealous advocacy norm" and duties as "officers of the courts" were "general
obligations in permanent tension, which must be balanced against one another";
but now advocacy is the "master norm"); ROBERT W. GORDON, LAWYERS AS THE
AmERICAN ARISTOCRACY (1998); see also Craig Enoch, Incivility in the Legal
System? Maybe It's the Rules, 47 SMU L. REV. 199, 201 (1994).
16. See infra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Gordon, Independence, supra note 7, at 20 n.59; David B.
Wilkins, Do Clients have Ethical Obligations to Lawyers? Some Lessons from the
Diversity Wars, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 855 (1998) ("Since time immemorial,
legal ethics discourse has been preoccupied with one central question: what are
the ethical limitations on the obligations lawyers owe their clients?"); Susan D.
Carle, Lawyers' Duty to do Justice: A New Look at the History of the 1908
Canons, 24 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 1, 3-5 (1999) ("[N]o issue in legal ethics has
been debated more often, and resolved less satisfactorily.").
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from its rhetorical use is the task which we are about to
undertake. 8
B. "Officer of the Court" and the Duty to Seek Justice
Argument
Attempting to resolve the purported conflict in the
lawyer's role, commentators argue that lawyers owe a
substantive duty to the judicial system and the public to
seek justice because they are "officers of the court." This
duty is separate from, and sometimes inconsistent with, the
duties a lawyer owes to her clients.19 This so-called "role-
differentiation thesis"" posits a separation between
personal morality and the conduct required of the lawyer
thus permitting the erroneous claim that lawyers are not
morally accountable for their client's goals. Moral non-
accountability is seen as the "central harm" of the standard
conception of'lawyering. To solve this problem requires a
substantive duty to do justice obligation." "Moral activism"
is the phrase that has captured the notion that lawyers
have a substantive duty to seek justice even when it is at
odds with the client's lawful instructions. According to
proponents, moral activism is needed because the
18. See Gaetke, supra note 6, at 42-43 (1989) (recognizing that "[tihe current
meaning of officer of the court is as elusive as its origins" and that the phrase
has been used so imprecisely and broadly that "one fails to act as an officer of
the court whenever he acts inappropriately as a lawyer").
19. See Serena Stier, Legal Ethics: The Integrity Thesis, 52 OHIO ST. L. J.
551, 555-56 (1991) (critiquing proponents and moral activists William H. Simon
and David Luban among others). Richard Wasserstrom's article in 1975 has
been instrumental in this discussion. See Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as
Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 3 (1975) (making the
observation that professionals (lawyers included) engage in varying degrees in
behavior which requires "put[ing] to one side considerations of various sorts-
and especially various moral considerations-that would otherwise be relevant
if not decisive," Wasserstrom concludes that because "the lawyer has a duty to
make his or her expertise fully available in the realization of the end sought by
the client.., the lawyer is, in essence, an amoral technician." Id. at 4. This
argument at once acknowledges the centrality of the lawyer's agency role and
yet falls to fully appreciate the role's proper limitations in an adversary system.
Even Wasserstrom concedes a critical danger: "[S]ubstitut[ing the lawyer's] own
private views of what ought to be legally permissible and impermissible for
those of the legislature... would constitute a surreptitious and undesirable
shift from a democracy to an oligarchy of lawyers." Id. at 11.
20. The term "role-differentiated behavior" comes from Wasserstrom, supra
note 19, at 3.
21. See id. at 564.
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traditional or standard conception of lawyer role makes it
impossible to be both a good person and a good lawyer."
The crux of the argument is that the lawyer's most
important role is as an "officer of the court" and, therefore,
the substantive duty to seek justice is paramount.
Professors William H. Simon and David Luban 4 are
among the most prominent and prolific writers on this
subject.25 Professor Simon grounds his proposal for "ethical
22. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
23. See William H. Simon, The Legal and the Ethical in Legal Ethics: A Brief
Rejoinder to Comments on the Practice of Justice, 51 STAN. L. REV. 991 (1999);
William H. Simon, "Thinking Like a Lawyer" About Ethical Questions, 27
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1998); William H. Simon, From the Trenches and Towers,
The Kaye Scholer Affair: The Lawyer's Duty of Candor and the Bar's
Temptation's of Evasion and Apology, 23 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 243 (1998); William
H. Simon, Essay Ethics, Professionalism, and Meaningful Work, 26 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 445 (1997); William H. Simon, Should Lawyers Obey the Law?, 38 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 217 (1996); William H. Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91
MICH. L. REV. 1703 (1993); William H. Simon, Reply: Further Reflections on
Libertarian Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1767 (1993); William H. Simon,
Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's Case, 50 MD. L. REV. 213
(1991). See generally WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE (1999).
24. See David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study (1988)
(arguing clients goals can be trumped by lawyers moral views); David Luban,
Contrived Ignorance, 87 GEO. L.J. 957 (1999); David Luban, Reason And
Passion in Legal Ethics, 51 STAN. L. REV. 873 (1999); David Luban,
Rediscovering Fuller's Legal Ethics, 11 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 801 (1998); David
Luban, The Bad Man and the Good Lawyer: A Centennial Essay on Holmes's
The Path of the Law, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1552 (1997) [hereinafter Luban,
The Bad Man]; David Luban, Legal Ideals and Moral Obligations: A Comment
on Simon, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 255 (1996); David Luban, The Social
Responsibilities of Lawyers: A Green Perspective, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 955
(1995); David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MCH. L. REV. 1729
(1993); David J. Luban, Legal Traditionalism, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1035 (1991);
David Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client
Relationship: A Reply to Stephen Ellmann, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1004 (1990)
[herinafter Luban, Partisanship]; David J. Luban, Essay Freedom and
Constraint in Legal Ethics: Some Mid-Course Corrections to Lawyers and
Justice, 49 MD. L. REV. 424 (1990); David Luban, The Noblesse Oblige Tradition
in the Practice of Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 717 (1988) [hereinafter Luban, The
Noblesse Oblige Tradition].
25. Other prominent scholars advocating a substantive "officer of the court"
role include Professors Robert W. Gordon and Harry I. Subin. See Robert W.
Gordon, Corporate Law as a Public Calling, 49 MD. L. REV. 255, 258 (1990)
(stating that even if at odds with client wishes, the lawyer should implement
own vision of public interest); Robert W. Gordon, Ethical Worlds, supra note 15,
at 728 (claiming that lawyers understood the "zealous advocacy norm" and
duties as "officers of the courts" were "general obligations in permanent tension,
which must be balanced against one another"; but now advocacy is the "master
norm"); ROBERT W. GORDON, LAWYERS AS THE AMERICAN ARISTOCRACY (1998);
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discretion" on the lawyer's role as an "officer of the court."26
Professor Luban's "ordinary morality" proposal is justified
by the attorney's role as "minister of justice."27
But what if lawyers do not owe duties to the court or
the public that are inconsistent with duties owed to clients
nor greater than duties owed by non-lawyers to the legal
system? If the duties to the court and the public are
Gordon, Independence, supra note 7, at 13; (acknowledging that when lawyers
talk about being officers of the court it is usually "anything but real." He then
urges suspending disbelief and applying "republican tradition" to give content
to the concept officer of the court); Harry I. Subin, The Criminal Lawyer's
Different Mission: Reflections of the "Right" to Present a False Case, 1 GEO J.
LEGAL ETHIcs 125 (1987) (outlining the appropriate boundaries that may be
used by attorneys when their clients' goals conflict with the truth); Harry I.
Subin, Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences to Prevent Harm,
70 IOwA L. REV. 1091 (1985) (arguing that disclosure of client confidences is
justified, in part, because of lawyer's role as officer of the court). For more
discussion of moral activism, see, for example, Paul R. Tremblay, Practiced
Moral Activism, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 9 (1995), discussing Simon and Luban,
and Carle, supra note 17, at 3-5, discussing Simon and Luban, the moral
activist view and the nonaccountability view.
26. William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARv. L. REV.
1083, 1091 (1988) [hereinafter Simon, Ethical Discretion] ("The discretionary
approach ... assumes a public dimension to the lawyer's role ... that
dimension is grounded in the lawyer's age-old claim to be an 'officer of the
court'...." Lawyers are entitled to use ethical discretion even when against
client goals.); see also id. at 1133. In basing his model, in part, on the concept
"officer of the court," Simon both acknowledges and capitalizes on the lack of "a
consensus about where to draw the line between these two aspects of the
lawyer's role [the advocate and an 'officer of the court' with responsibilities to
third parties, the public, and the law], and the two have always been in tension
within the professional culture." Id.
27. Luban, The Bad Man, supra note 24, at 1551-52 (connecting "minister of
justice" with the lawyer's role as an "officer of the court" and observing that he,
Simon, and Gordon have advanced this as a justification for the lawyer's duty to
seek justice); see also Luban, The Noblesse Oblige Tradition, supra note 24, at
737-39.
28. There are scholars who both acknowledge the attorney's agency role and
recognize that the characterization officer of the court has little or no
substantive content. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. The Client Fraud Problem as a
Justinian Quartet: An Extended Analysis, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1041, 1049
(1997). An advocate's function is to be an intermediary between the client and
the court, "carefully controlling what the court will learn about what the client
knows. Statements cast in terms of "complete loyalty" [to the client] and
"complete candor" [to the court] must be regarded as hortatory, hypocrisy, or
simply nonsense." Id.; see also Deborah Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, 44
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 665 (1994) (stating that lawyers obligations as officers of
the court are "quite limited and largely track the prohibitions on criminal and
fraudulent conduct that govern all participants in the legal process"). Professor
Rhode, however, urges that the characterization be made more meaningful.
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merely rhetorical, the role certainly can not bear the weight
of these moral activist schemes no matter how well
intentioned or appealing such a role may be to some.
Moreover, if lawyers are agents,29 such proposals may be so
fundamentally incompatible with agency law that
acceptance would require reconsideration of the current
basic understanding of the attorney's role within the
adversary system.
C. The Label of "Officer of the Court"
There are substantive and process dimensions to the
attorney's role as an "officer of the court." The substantive
aspect of the role, however, is limited to a gate-keeping or
screening function. ° As for process, attorneys ensure that
29. A brief introduction to key agency concepts is necessary. The agency
relation enables one (the agent) to act or speak on behalf of another (the
principal) and commit them, either allowing the individual to be in more than
one place at the same time, or to benefit from one with greater knowledge and
skill. The duty of obedience distinguishes the agent from all others with
fiduciary responsibilities. The agent's task is not to determine the best interest
of the principal and then act to achieve it. Rather the agent's duty is to obey the
principal's lawful instructions. That duty, however, is not absolute. No agent is
permitted to engage in conduct that is illegal. For agents like attorneys who are
nonemployee agents or independent contractors, the principal exercises control
over goals and objectives, but not the means to accomplish them. See infra Part
II.
30. Attorneys perform a screening function by preventing the filing of claims
that are meritless. See Nesbitt v. Hopkins, 907 F. Supp. 1317, 1321 n.4 (D. Neb.
1995).
As an officer of the court, counsel ... properly acts as "screen" or
"filter" of the client's cause, a duty involving both distillation and
exclusion. Distillation requires the lawyer to refine underlying facts
and argument into a cogent claim for relief, thereby preserving scarce
judicial resources otherwise spent navigating through a morass of
allegations and legal citation. Exclusion, on the other hand, requires the
lawyer to decline a client's invitation to present to the court claims not
well-grounded in fact and law, as well as refuse to engage in conduct
which, although furthering the ends of the client is inconsistent with the
lawyer's professional duty to the court. Sometimes, this may involve
counseling the client that he is a "damned fool[] and should stop." This
exclusionary duty is encapsulated in Rule l's insistence that signed
pleadings certify a lawyer's knowledge and belief, "formed after an
inquiry reasonable under the circumstances," that the client's claims
are arguably grounded in law and likely to have evidentiary support.
Ignoring these twin duties renders the lawyer little more than a "hired
gun... [whol, once engaged, does his client's bidding, lawful or not,
ethical or not."
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis altered from original). This standard concedes
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the court can perform its function in the adversary system
by discovering the facts and the law and then presenting
them so that disputes can be efficiently, and some think
optimally, resolved.3 ' This procedural duty to the court is
identical to part of the obligation the lawyer owes the client.
Duty to the client requires following the client's lawful
instructions faithfully. Correspondingly, this part of the
lawyer's duty to the court requires presentation of the
client's matter so that it may be resolved in accordance with
the law. To this point, these aspects of the attorney's role
are not in conflict.
Much of the confusion surrounding the label "officer of
the court" is caused by the phrase itself. The word "officer"
conjures up images of police, law enforcement, and
government. When "officer" and "court" are connected, the
phrase insinuates a formal and continuing special
relationship with access and responsibilities to authority
not possessed by, or due by, others.33 Since the club is
exclusive-only lawyers can participate-exceptional
importance and status is implied.34 According to one
commentator:
The very words "officer of the court" connote a mandatory public
interest role for lawyers and suggest that lawyers sometimes must
act in a quasi-judicial or quasi-official capacity despite duties owed
to their clients.35 The primary distinguishing characteristic of the
a low gate consistent with the lawyer's role as agent providing access to the
legal system. The language for which emphasis has been added is typical of
references to "duty to the court" but says no more than if the clients ends are
not in accordance with law the lawyer is prohibited from assisting. The rule is
the same for agents. See infra Part II.
31. See Stephan A. Landsman, A Brief Description of the Development of the
Adversary System, 44 0O1O ST. L.J. 713 (1983) (collecting and discussing
commentators critical of the adversary system). But see 2 JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 1697 (1904) (stating that cross-
examination is the greatest engine for discovering the truth ever invented).
32. See infra notes 270-91 and accompanying text.
33. See Gaetke, supra note 6, at 43 (stating that the words "officer of the
court" "inherently suggest... that lawyers owe a special duty to the judicial
system or, perhaps, to the public that other participants in the legal process do
not owe").
34. See id. at 43 n.21 (quoting In re Integration of Neb. State Bar Ass'n, 275
N.W. 265, 268 (Neb. 1937)) ("At least implicitly, this special duty elevates the
interests of the judicial system or of the general public above those of the client
or lawyer.").
35. Id. at 48 n.50. Ironically, the label itself suggests "an agency
relationship between the court as principal and the lawyer as agent. A lawyer's
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duties making up the officer of the court obligation, therefore,
must be their subordination of the interests of the client and the
lawyer to those of the judicial system and the public. 36
In words and concept, the characterization "officer of
the court" intimates a role for attorneys superior to that of
non-lawyers, suggesting that the lawyer owes her first
fidelity to the court.
[Tihe officer of the court model contemplates that clients hire
something other than a zealous advocate when they enlist the
services of a lawyer. Rather, they hire a legal representative whose
obligations to the judicial system at times supercede the undivided
fidelity and enthusiasm an agent owes to his principal .
In fact, the notion that the attorney has a meaningful
and distinct role as an "officer of the court" is largely an
illusion caused by self-love and self-promotion.38 "Careful
analysis of the role of the lawyer within the adversarial
legal system reveals the characterization to be vacuous and
unduly self- laudatory. It confuses lawyers and misleads the
public."39 The perpetuation of the lawyer role as an "officer
of the court" by the profession is tantamount to a charade."
Conflict between the duties of loyalty and zealous
advocacy and the duty to seek justice exists only if the
latter is inconsistent with the former and greater than the
general obligations to the legal system all must bear.4 In
obligation to act as an officer of the court implies that in those instances his
primary allegiance is to the court rather than to the lawyer's other principal,
the client." Id. (citing Langen v. Borkowsld et. al., 206 N.W. 181, 190 (Wis.
1925)).
36. Id. at 48.
37. Id. at 43-44.
38. See id. at 44-45. (observing that the label has "virtuous overtones" which
directly benefit attorneys by distinguishing them from other professional agents
and by emphasizing the important public function lawyers have); see also
CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETiucs 2-3 (1986) (referring to the
tendency of lawyers to engage in such self-flattery as "the hero mythology" of
the legal profession); Gordon, Independence, supra note 7, at 2.
39. Gaetke, supra note 6, at 39.
40. See id. at 45. ("[Imf the characterization bears little relationship to the
actual obligations of lawyers, its repeated declaration by the courts, the
organized bar, and individual lawyers is sheer professional puffery or, worse,
deliberate deceit.").
41. See id. at 49 ("An ethical requirement is part of the lawyer's obligation
as an officer of the court only if it compels conduct by a lawyer that
subordinates the interest of the client and the lawyer to those of the judicial
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order to qualify as an "officer of the court" duty, a duty
must be inconsistent with, or superior to, an obligation
owed to the client and not a general responsibility to the
judicial system or the public shared by all. As we shall see,
the lawyer's obligations to anyone or any ideal other than
her client are nearly identical with the responsibilities of all
citizens."
1. "Officer of the Court"-Pre-revolution. Before turning
to modern usage it will be informative to look backward,
first to medieval England and then quickly to the Roman
Empire, ancient Greece, and finally back to America.
a. Medieval England.43 From at least the 13th Century,
when the courts began to regulate the admission of lawyers
and their conduct, lawyers have been considered "officers
of the court."45 Lawyers may also have been considered
"officers of the court" because they were frequently
system or the public, and also is not coextensive with an obligation imposed on
laymen participating in the legal process.").
42. See generally Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Lawyers' Contracts is
Different, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 443 (1998) (discussing differences between
treatment of lawyers and others in contract law); Nathan M. Crystal, The
Lawyer's Duty to Disclose Material Facts in Contract or Settlement Negotiations,
87 KY. L.J. 1055, 1083 (1999).
43. For a throughly researched article on the legal profession in medieval
England see Jonathan Rose, The Legal Profession in Medieval England: A
History of Regulation, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1 (1998); see also PAUL BRAND, THE
ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH LEGAL PROFESSION (1992) (detailing and analyzing
Anglo-Norman England through Edward I).
44. See EDMUND B.V. CHRISTIAN, A SHORT HISTORY OF SOLICITORS 13 (1896);
Rose, supra note 43, at 49; People ex rel Karlin v. Culkin, 162 N.E. 487, 490-91
(N.Y. 1928); 1 ROT. PARL. 84, no. 22, 20 Edw. 1 (1292) (The Ordinance of 1292).
45. See Rose, supra note 43, at 79; see also ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER
FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 44 (1953) (recounting how the agent for
litigation became subject to control by the courts and began to be regarded as
an officer of the courts). The current distinction between the roles of solicitor
and barrister began under different names in the middle ages. See infra notes
49, 213-16 and accompanying text; ROBERT ROBSON, THE ATTORNEY IN
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 2 (1959). Barristers were not subjected to the
same kind of control by courts as attorneys because they "did not stand in [the]
client's place, but only used his skilled voice on his behalf." Id. Unlike the
attorney, the barrister's role mostly played out in court in the presence of the
client, the client's attorney or both, and the judge, and outside of court the
barrister typically functioned in the presence of or under the supervision of the
attorney. Therefore, the need for intense supervision by the courts was
considerably reduced. See id.
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employed as clerks of the courts46 and were allowed to
represent clients.47 For the lawyers who were clerks of the
court, the label "officer of the court" was literally true.
Being an "officer of the court," however, imposed no
duties on lawyers that were inconsistent with the duties
owed to clients.4 ' As "officers of the court," lawyers49 were
prohibited from engaging in illegal conduct, and subject to
sanction-fine, disbarment, or jail if they violated these
prohibitions. There was not a code of professional
responsibility or separate regulatory or disciplinary
authorities in medieval England. Moreover, neither tort
nor contract remedies had yet been commonly applied to
lawyers.5' As a result, discipline was imposed by judges
pursuant to statute, ordinance, and, to a lesser extent,
inherent judicial power."
The Statute of Westminster the First in 1275 was
directed at allegations of lawyer misconduct that included
extortion and bribery;53 it also prohibited deceit, collusion or
46. See ROBSON, supra note 45, at 104; see also GEO. W. WARVILLE, ESSAYS IN
LEGAL ETMICS 29-31 (2d ed. 1920) (claiming the term relates directly to the fact
of licensure by the Crown); Committee on Prof. Ethics v. Humphrey, 377
N.W.2d 643, 648 (Iowa 1985) (Reynoldson, C.J., concurring) (same).
47. ROBSON, supra note 45, at 108 (stating that "the fees of the clerk of the
peace were limited by an act of 1755, but the office continued to be much sought
after, for apart from the fees and the salary, the position brought in much
profitable legal business of which the clerk had the first picking"); see also Rose,
supra note 43, at 11; BRAND, supra note 43, at 51.
48. As was the case in the Roman Empire and ancient Greece, in early
medieval England those assisting others in legal proceedings were friends or
relatives. See CmSTIAN, supra note 44, at 9; BRAND, supra note 43, at 10, 46,
69.
49. In England, individuals performing an advocacy and/or representative
role in legal proceedings were known by different names at different times.
While on occasion some individuals may have served in both capacities, lawyer
role in medieval England was (and still is to a large extent) divided between a
true agent, i.e., an attorney who could speak and act for the client in the client's
absence (now usually known as "solicitor") and one who spoke for and
represented the client but only in the client's (or client's solicitor's) presence.
This individual, now known as barrister, has also been known as "pleader,"
"narratores," "counteurs," "serjeants-conteurs," or "serjeants." There is some
evidence that pleaders were also treated as officers of the court. See POUND,
supra note 45, at 77; Rose, supra note 43, at 79.
50. See Rose, supra note 43, at 79.
51. See id.; see also David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105
HARV. L. REV. 799, 807 (1992).
52. See Wilkins, supra note 51, at 87.
53. See Rose, supra note 43, at 53 ("[T]his first regulation of lawyers...
dealt with champerty, extortion, bribery, abuse of official power, maintenance,
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malfeasance in the King's Court. 4 At the time, one of the
most common defenses to claims was to allege any false or
frivolous charge.55 By the terms of a 1403 statute, any
attorney who fabricated evidence or encouraged someone to
bring a frivolous suit was suspended from the court for a
year. 6 The Court of Common Pleas in 1564 issued an order
indicating that the penalty for lack of due diligence,
excessive error, and absence from court" would be expulsion
from the Attorney's Roll of the Court and possible fines.58
The King's Bench Court threatened to suspend a lawyer for
being absent unless he had a valid excuse.59 Both courts
prohibited lawyers from practicing under an alias or
allowing others to practice under the lawyer's name,
violations which carried a penalty of expulsion."
In 1567, a special jury made up of "officers, clerks, and
and abusive litigation practices by royal and court officials, lawyers, and
individual litigants.").
54. See id. at 49-50; see also CHRISTIAN, supra note 44, at 13-14. The Statute
of Westminster the First imposed penalties "on any serjeant, pleader or other
who was guilty of any manner of deceit or collusion in the King's Court, or
consented unto it in deceit of the court or to beguile the court or the party; and
champerty and maintenance were forbidden." BRAND, supra note 43, at 124. An
instance of deceit in the context of duty to the court is described by Brand. A
seijeant having learned that prior client representations were false refused to
repeat these statements and deserted his clients in the middle of the case. The
court found this withdrawal to be entirely appropriate. See id.
55. See CHRISTIAN, supra note 44, at 17-18.
The fact that so- much of the prevalent injustice was committed under
or indeed by means of forms of law, is connected with another
character of the age, namely, its extreme litigiousness. Legal chicane
was one of the most regular weapons of offence and defence, and to
trump up charges, however frivolous, against an adversary, one of the
most effectual means of parrying inconvenient charges against oneself.
The prevalence of false indictments and malicious suits is a frequent
subject of complaint in Parliament. Forgery of documents seems to
have been common, and when statutes were passed against this
practice, advantage was taken of these statutes to throw suspicion on
genuine title deeds.
Id.
56. See Henry IV, ch. 18 (1402) (Eng.).
57. Because the medieval courts were infrequently in session in a particular
locale, absence created serious problems. See BRAND, supra note 43, at 5.
58. See CHRISTIAN, supra note 44, at 38-39.
59. See id. at 42-43 (stating that in 1582 "[the rule against absence from the
court were made more stringent. Any attorney absent for two terms, except for
sickness or like cause, was to be forejudged and no longer attorney. That,
indeed, was the almost universal penalty for professional misdoings").
60. See id.
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attorneys" was convened to inquire into "falsities, erasures
contempts and misprisions" committed by attorneys.6
1
"[F] alsity" was defined as
where a man outwardly will set a shew, a face and countenance
that he doth well, and truly knowing inwardly and to himself that
it is not so, but mere subtlety and falsehood, as, for example, if he
will sue forth of purpose false process, or wittingly of himself will
minister a false and foreign plea, not taking it of his client.6 2
An "erasure" was simply a wrongful alteration of the
record and a contempt was committed by "officers, clerks
[others], and attorneys" who do not obey court orders.65
Knowledge that a felony was committed and failure to
report it was (and is)' considered misprision." Lawyers who
were dilatory with their client's matters were also
investigated.6 Aside from neglecting client matters, the
other subjects of the investigation of 1567 amounted to
criminal conduct, conduct in which lawyers and non-
lawyers alike were prohibited from engaging. In medieval
England, the notion of a substantive duty to do justice
aspect to the lawyer's "officer of the court" role that was
inconsistent with client loyalty and greater than the
obligations of non-lawyers did not exist.
b. Roman Empire. Whether advocates or jurisconsults67
owed obligations to the courts or society that were both
greater than, or different from, duties owed by all in the
Roman Empire, and potentially incompatible with the
duties owed to clients is unclear.8 But there is no clear
61. See Ex rel Karlin v. Culkin, 162 N.E. 487, 490-91 (N.Y. 1928).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1995) (misprision of felony).
65. See Karlin, 162 N.E. at 491 ("A misprision is where a man knoweth
treason or felony to be done, and yet doth conceal it and keep it close.") (citing
Easter Term, 9 Eliz. (1567)).
66. See id. ("Of these and like negligences' the jury shall inquire; and also of
such attorneys' as be late and slack comers to the term by reason whereof their
clients' matters not go forward.' 'We shall deprive such of their attorneyship.'
The end of the inquisition was, not punishment, but discipline."), quoted in
Easter Term, 9 Eliz. (1587).
67. See Anton-Herman Chroust, The Legal Profession in Ancient Republican
Rome, 30 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 97, 144-45 (1954-55) [hereinafter Chroust, The
Legal Profession] Qjurisconsults were Roman lawyers).
68. Certain similarities between the systems exist, although the historical
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evidence of such a duty. Early in the Roman Empire the
person performing in the lawyer role was usually a relative
or friend." Given the close personal nature of the
relationship, imposition a of special duty to do justice
obligation inconsistent with the feelings of loyalty a person
so close to the client would naturally possess, seems
unlikely and quite unrealistic. The same is true for the
head of a clan (patronus or patron),"0 who was obligated by
Roman ideals of "chivalry" to protect his clients7' by
representing them in court and explaining the law to
them. 2 "Thus this duty of the patron towards his client was
the basis both of the advocate's function and of the
jurisconsult's function as they developed in Rome." 3 In
addition to providing legal advice and assistance to private
clients and preparing legal documents, the jurisconsult
advised judicial magistrates.74 In this latter role, the
magistrate appears to have been simply another client.
c. Ancient Greece. Here again the historical record is
not entirely clear, but there is no evidence suggesting that
record not entirely clear and comparison with our present day adversary system
is imperfect.
69. See POUND, supra note 45, at 45; see also Chroust, The Legal Profession,
supra note 67, at 136.
70. See Chroust, The Legal Profession, supra note 67, at 106 ("[Platronus
referred to a powerful patrician who assumed a protective attitude toward
certain people, namely, "clients," who had put themselves under the protection
of his clan.").
71. See POUND, supra note 45, at 44 ("When he appeared in court to argue
he was called a patronus causarum or simply patronus, and the person he
represented was called a client. These terms take us back to the origin of
Roman advocacy in the relation of the head of a patrician household to his
dependents in the polity of the old city.").
72. See id. at 45 ("[Clients] were entitled to be protected by the patron. In
particular, the patron was bound to appear in court for his clients, originally as
representing the kin group of which they were taken to be members and explain
the law to them, since knowledge of the old customary law of the city was a
monopoly of the heads of the patrician households."); see also Chroust, The
Legal Profession, supra note 67, at 136 (stating that advocacy made its first
appearance in early Rome as "chivalrous help and assistance... afforded by
the patron... [on] behalf of a friend, neighbor or suppliant").
73. POUND, supra note 45, at 45.
74. See Anton-Herman Chroust, The Emergence of Professional Standards
and the Rise of the Legal Profession: The Graeco-Roman Period, 36 BOSTON U. L.
REV. 587, 593 (1956) (discussing that the early Roman jurisconsult gave legal
advice and legal assistance to private parties and instructed magistrates)
[hereinafter Chroust, Emergence].
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advocates in ancient Greece owed duties to legal tribunals
that were greater or different than any other member of the
polity. First, the person filling the role of assistant was
usually a relative or friend." The nature of this relationship
suggests that it would be unrealistic to impose a special
duty to the court not shared by all members of the
community. Second, the advocate either appeared with the
party or never appeared before the tribunal. This adjunct
status also suggests the absence of duties owed to the
tribunal beyond those owed by all.
2. "Officer of the Court" in America. In the American
legal system, lawyers have never owed duties to justice
inconsistent with responsibilities to clients or greater than
the obligations of non-lawyers. The perspective offered by a
historical examination of the subject is particularly
enlightening76  because rhetoric nourished by self-
importance and self-interest has played such a large part in
defining this ephemeral concept.
a. David Hoffman. David Hoffman published the first
legal ethics treatise in America in 1817. His 1836 edition
of "Course of Legal Study" included an expanded code of
ethics entitled "Fifty Resolutions in Regard to Professional
Deportment."78 These resolutions are "most notable for their
refusal to separate private morality from public morality, or
to admit that practitioners might ever be guided by norms
that did not equally apply to all other citizens."79 Hoffman's
view of legal ethics had a decidedly religious focus"
75. See POUND, supra note 45, at 31-32; see also WILLIAM FORSYTH, TIE
HISTORY OF THE LAWYER 21 (1875).
76. See Hoeflich, supra note 14, at 816 ("[Klnowing the history of views on
the lawyer-client relationship and the obligations of representation can help us
in assessing our current situation.").
77. See id. at 795. See generally Maxwell Bloomfield, David Hoffman and
the Shaping of a Republican Legal Culture, 38 Md. L. Rev. 673 (1979) (providing
a historical and biographical review of Hoffman).
78. DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY: ADDRESSED TO STUDENTS
AND THE PROFESSION GENERALLY 752 (William S. Hein & Co. 1968) (1836).
79. Bloomfield, supra note 77, at 684.
80. See HOFFMAN, supra note 78, at 55. Professor Carle refers to his
approach as "religious jurisprudence." Carle, supra note 17, at 10-11. Dean
Hoeflich finds implicit in Hoffinan's resolutions that the lawyer must "exercise
their own moral judgment" in representing a client. Hoeflich, supra note 14, at
797-98.
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requiring the lawyer to seek justice and avoid doing
injustice even when it required disobeying the client's
lawful instructions. Thus, Hoffman's conception of the
lawyer's role subordinated client loyalty to the goal of
justice.8' For example, he urged that lawyers refuse to plead
the Statute of Limitations so as to avoid becoming a partner
in the client's "knavery."82 In form if not in content,
Hoffman's emphasis on the importance of the lawyer's
conscience as a guide for professional conduct 8 3 is quite
similar to the position of many modern commentators.84 It is
also the dissenting, non-controlling view as measured by
the current rules of professional responsibility.85
b. George Sharswood. The writer who had the most
important and widespread impact on professional ethics
and role is George Sharswood.8 He is said to be the father
of legal ethics,87 although only recently has modern ethics
scholarship begun to examine his work.8 Sharswood's "An
81. See Bloomfield, supra note 77, at 684.
82. HOFFMAN, supra note 78, at 754.
83. See Bloomfield, supra note 77, at 684.
84. See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
85. See Carle, supra note 17, at 4 (stating that nonaccountability is the
prevailing view of the modem American private bar and is reflected in the
Modem Rules of Professional Conduct).
86. George Sharswood was born in 1810, was graduated from the Classical
Department of the University of Pennsylvania and began the study of law
under the preceptorship of a distinguished advocate of the bar. He was elected
to the state legislature three times and became a judge in 1845 at the age of 35,
fourteen years after being admitted to the bar. Having served as a trial judge
for 22 years, Sharswood was elected to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
1867, where he became Chief Justice in 1879 and from which he retired in 1883.
In 1850 Sharswood became a Professor of Law at the Law Department of the
University of Pennsylvania an continued an association until after his election
to the Supreme Court. See SHARSWOOD, infra note 90, memorial.
87. Professor Russell G. Pearce's important rediscovery of George
Sharswood has had considerable influence on the content of the contemporary
ethics dialogue. See Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of
the Legal Ethics Codes, 6 GEO J. LEGAL ETHIcs 241 (1992).
88. See id. Since Professor Pearce's article many scholars have written
about the history of legal ethics in America. See, e.g., Carle, supra note 17;
Hoeflich, supra note 14, at 816; Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Legal Profession:
The Impact of Law and Legal Theory, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 239 (1998); Alliston
Marston, Guiding the Profession: The 1887 Code of Ethics of the Alabama State
Bar Association, 49 ALA. L. REV. 471 (1998); Alva Hugh Maddox, Lawyers: The
Aristocracy of Democracy or "Skunks, Snakes, and Sharks"?, 29 CUMB L. REV.
323 (1998-99); James E. Moliterno, Lawyer Creeds and Moral Seismography, 32
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 781 (1997).
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Essay in Professional Ethics" 9 first delivered in 1854"0 is
89. The first edition of his Essay was originally published as "Compend of
Lectures on the Aims and Duties of the Profession of the Law." SHARSWOOD,
infra note 90, memorial. It went through four editions in Sharswood's lifetime,
the latest in 1876. See id. The Essay is divided into two parts, the first
addresses the lawyer's duties to the public or state, and the second discusses
the lawyer's duties to the court, other lawyers, and the client. The Essay is 182
pages in length. The first 54 pages are devoted to part I in which he discusses at
length the importance of property rights. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN
LEGAL ETHICS § 2.6.2 n.20 (describing this discussion as a "diatribe" and an
example of a writer having an "agenda").
90. Excerpts from Part I of the Essay are included to inform our
understanding of Sharswood and the time in which he wrote. See GEORGE
SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 9 (1993) (noting that "Itihe
dignity and importance of the Profession of the Law, in a public point of view,
can hardly be over-estimated").
There is, perhaps, no profession, after that of the sacred ministry, in
which a high-toned morality is more imperatively necessary than that
of the law. There is certainly, without any exception, no profession in
which so many temptations beset the path to swerve from the line of
strict integrity; in which so many delicate and difficult questions of
duty are continually arising. There are pitfalls and mantraps at every
step, and the mere youth, at the very outset of his career, needs often
the prudence and self-denial, as well as the moral courage, which
belong commonly to riper years.
Id. at 55; see id. at 10 (reflecting on the subject of legislation: "It is the noblest
work in which the intellectual powers of man can be engaged, as it resembles
most nearly the work of the Deity"); id. (commenting on the role of government:
"What government owes to society, and all it owes, is the impartial
administration of equal and just laws. This produces security of life, liberty, and
of property."); id. at 21 (revealing that Sharswood placed special emphasis on
property, as did others of his time and other contemporary scholars. "Property
has an especial claim to protection against the government itself').
Men have a right not only to be well governed, but to be cheaply
governed-as cheaply as is consistent with the due maintenance of that
security, for which society was formed and government instituted.
This, the sole legitimate end and object of law, is never to be lost sight
of-security to men in the free enjoyment and development of their
capacities for happiness-SECURITY-nothing less-but nothing more. To
compel men to contribute of the earnings or accumulations of industry,
their own or inherited, to objects beyond this, not within the legitimate
sphere of legislation, to appropriate the money in the public treasury to
such objects, is a perversion and abuse of the powers of government,
little if anything short of legalized robbery.
Id. at 21-22 (emphasis in original); see id. at 23 (reiterating that "[t]here is not
much danger of erring upon the side of too little law. The world is notoriously
too much governed"); see also id. at 25-26 (recognizing that lawyers played a
central role in public life).
The American lawyer, considering the compass of his varied duties,
and the probable call which will be made on him especially to enter the
halls of legislation, must be a jurist. From the ranks of the Bar, more
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the basis for the modern rules of professional
responsibility.9
The significance of Sharswood's deep influence stems in
part from the comprehensiveness of his presentation and, in
part, from his eloquent articulation of the dominant view of
attorney ethics. Sharswood's views are more practical than
Hoffman's views which were then and remain at best
aspirational.92 Although Sharswood agreed with "many [of
frequently than from any other profession, are men called to fill the
highest public stations in the service of the country, at home and
abroad.
Id.
Great as is the influence which the profession of the law can and does
exercise upon the legislation of a country, the actual administration of
law is entirely in their hands. To a large extent by private counsel, by
the publication of works of research and learning, by arguments in
courts of justice to assist those who are to determine what is the law,
and to apply it to the facts, as well as in the actual exercise of
judicature, this whole important province of government, which comes
home so nearly to every man's fireside, is intrusted necessarily to
lawyers.
Id. at 30-31.
Whether they seek them or are sought, lawyers, in point of fact, always
have filled, in much the larger proportion over every other profession,
the most important public posts. They will continue to do so, at least so
long as the profession holds the high and well-merited place it now
does in the public confidence.
Id. at 54.
91. The 1887 Alabama State Bar Code of Ethics, the 1908 American Bar
Association's Cannons of Ethics, the subsequent ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility of 1969, the ABA Model Rules of Professional Responsibility of
1983, all reflect to a significant extent the contents of his Essay of 1854. As
Professor Pearce has observed, subsequent ethics code writers relied quite
heavily on Sharswood, in many instances using sections without any or
significant alteration. See Pearce, supra note 87, at 241, 243-47 (discussing
significance of Sharswood's essay in drafting of the ABA Cannons and his
continuing influence on the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and
Model Rules of Professional Conduct).
92. As recent commentators have observed, there were others in this period
who discussed legal ethics. See generally Carle, supra note 17. Dean Hoeflich
discusses a variety of 19th century sources including: Simon Greenleafs
inaugural address upon becoming a chaired professor at the Harvard Law
School, addresses of Bar leaders from Philadelphia, the Reverend Henry
Boardman's eulogy of a Philadelphia Bar leader, Justice Story's eulogy of Chief
Justice John Marshall, an anonymous memorial to a prominent South Carolina
Bar leader, an obituary notice of a prominent Vermont attorney, and others. See
Hoeflich, supra note 14. From reviewing these sources (and Hoffman and
Sharswood), Hoeflich concludes that "[tihe normative rule in the nineteenth
century was that a lawyer should choose honor over financial success." Id. at
817. Although interesting, reliance on some of these sources, in particular,
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Hoffman's Fifty Resolutions] specific recommendations" he
had fundamental differences with Hoffman about basic role
definition. 3 Sharswood "severed the tie between public and
private morality" preferring instead a role in which
attorneys utilized the law and rules of litigation to provide
clients with vigorous representation so that justice could be
determined by judge or jury.94
While there were major differences between
Sharswood's and Hoffman's views, the available evidence
suggests that Sharswood's conception of the attorney's role
was the mainstream view.95 In addition to Professor
Bloomfield's observation that Sharswood's description of the
lawyer's role was the "standard work,"96 early American and
English history support a conception of attorney role as
having a representative-not justice seeking-character.97
Sharswood's occupation as judge, the essay's contents the
setting, audience, 8 and purpose of the presentation,e9 all
eulogies and memorial addresses as "determining normative ethical values for
lawyers" is difficult to accept at least without more authority on this genre than
is offered. Id. at 809. More important, I disagree with Hoeflich's interpretation
of most of these sources. Properly read they are consistent with the lawyer's
responsibilities to procedural rights as agent and do not stand for the creation
of substantive justice seeking duties to the court. Moreover, these sources often
follow a familiar pattern: grand rhetoric followed by agency principles. See
supra notes 6-18 and infra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
93. See infra notes 100-06 and accompanying text.
94. Id.
95. As noted, Professor Pearce's 1992 article has triggered renewed interest
in the history of legal ethics in America. Professors Pearce, Hoeflich, and Carle
find republican themes in Sharswood's Essay, indeed, unlike Professor Pearce,
Professor Carle finds Sharswood's and Hoffman's views essentially identical.
See Carle, supra note 17, at 10 ("Their view ... posited that lawyers could and
should exert their sense of justice in individual cases to steer the legal system
toward just results."). Professor Simon also finds in Hoffman's and Sharswood's
writings some historical support for his theory of ethical discretion. See Simon,
Ethical Discretion, supra note 26, at 1134. While I too see republican themes in
Sharswood's Essay, I believe they are contradicted by other more consistent
text. See infra notes 113-22 and accompanying text. Moreover, I attribute them
to the rhetoric which has so dominated the "officer of the court" concept and to
Sharswood's (and others during the 19th Century) "religious jurisprudence,"
i.e., their penchant for combining religious principles with legal principles. See
Carle, supra note 17, at 10, and accompanying text.
96. See Bloomfield, supra note 77, at 687; Carle, supra note 17, at 11 ("It is
doubtful that Hoffman's Resolutions had much influence on the practicing bar
of his day.").
97. See infra notes 270-90 and accompanying text.
98. The audience consisted of University of Pennsylvania students studying
law and lawyers.
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support characterizing the Essay as the "standard work.""'
Examining the Essay should inform our :understanding of
lawyer role because it was relied on so heavily for the rules
of professional responsibility from 1887 to the present
day.' The Essay should be particularly instructive about
the conflict in role definition between the attorney as
advocate and attorney as an officer of the court: the extent
to which attorneys are agents for clients or justice seekers
who owe superior duties to the court.
i. "Can a Good Lawyer be a Good Person?" Recognizing
the possibility of conflict among attorney obligations,
Sharswood asked a variant of the question contemporary
scholars claim, is central to legal ethics:0 2 "Can a good
lawyer also be a good person?"" Sharswood claims that
attorneys have affirmative obligations to justice and truth
that are peculiar to their professional role. He asserts that
lawyers should "use no falsehood," and "[tiruth in all its
99. Its frequent instrumental advice lends fuirther support. See generally
SHARSWOOD supra note 90, Essay Part II.
100. Bloomfield, supra note 77, at 687.
101. See Pearce, supra note 87, at 243-47; see also Carle, supra note 17, at 9
(noting that Hoffman's Resolutions and Sharswood's Essay were distributed to
the committee charged with drafting what became the ABA 1908 Canons).
102. See Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend. The Moral Foundations of the
Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976); Stephen Gillers, Can a Good
Lawyer be a Bad Person?, 84 MIOH. L. REV. 1011 (1986); Landsman, supra note
31, at 713; THOMAS L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER 32 (1981);
Harry T. Edwards, A Lawyer's Duty to Serve the Public Good, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1148 (1990); Rob Atkinson, Beyond the New Role Morality for Lawyers, 51 MD.
L. REV. 853, 855 (1992).
[Tihe central question of legal ethics is usually posed as 'May a lawyer
always do all that the law allows for every client?' This formulation
reflects the orthodox answer, which has always been yes .... To do all
that the letter of the law allows for clients, even if that causes
considerable harm to innocent third parties, is not only permitted, but
perhaps required, of lawyers. It is not just one way to be both a good
person and a good lawyer; it is the only true way.
Atkinson, supra, at 855. It is noted later that whether one can be a good lawyer
and a good person depends on the existence of an objective set of norms binding
on individuals which Atkinson denies. See id.at 869-71. David B. Wilkins, Do
Clients have Ethical Obligations to Lawyers? Some Lessons from the Diversity
Wars, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 855 (1998). See generally Stier, supra note 19;
Carle, supra note 17.
103. SHARSWOOD, supra note 90, at 81. Sharswood's formulation is: "But
what are the limits of his duty when the legal demands or interests of his client
conflict with his own sense of what is just and right? This is a problem by no
means of easy solution."
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simplicity-truth to the court, client, and adversary-should
be indeed the polar star of the lawyer."1 4 "[N]o man can
ever be a truly great lawyer, who is not in every sense of the
word, a good man." °5 Finally:
[From the start of the lawyer's career,] let him cultivate, above all
things, truth, simplicity and candor: they are the cardinal virtues
of a lawyer. Let him always seek to have a clear understanding of
his object: be sure it is honest and right, and then march directly
to it. The covert, indirect, and insidious way of doing anything, is
always the wrong way.1o
The conclusion that Sharswood believed that the lawyer
should pursue truth and justice even if that is in conflict
with the client's desires would seem inescapable; 7 however,
104. Id. at 167.
105. Id. at 168.
106. Id. at 169.
107. See Carle, supra note 17, at 13 n.23 (concluding that Sharswood "comes
down unequivocally in favor of recognizing a duty to do justice on the part of
individual lawyers in particular cases."). This was not Sharswood's view,
however, except possibly in one small category of cases:
Counsel, however, may and even ought to refuse to act under
instructions from a client to defeat what he believes to be an honest
and just claim, by insisting upon the slips of the opposite party, by
sharp practice, or special pleading-in short, by any other means than a
fair trial on the merits in open court. There is no professional duty, no
virtual engagement with the client, which compels an advocate to
resort to such measures, to secure success in any cause, just or unjust;
and when so instructed, if he believes it to be intended to gain an
unrighteous object, he ought to throw up the cause, and retire from all
connection with it, rather than thus be a participator in other men's
sins.
SHARSWOOD, supra note 90, at 98-99 (emphasis added). Even in this instance he
does not urge withdrawal unless the client insists upon the use of wrongful
means which lawyers as agents have the discretion to reject. Sharswood also
identified another instance in which the lawyer might consider withdrawing:
It is not every case in which a man has a legal right that he has a
moral right to claim the benefit of such laws. When a debtor, with
ample means to pay, only wants to harass and worry his creditor, who
has resorted to legal process and obtained a judgment, by keeping him
out of his money, as it is often expressed, as long as he can; or where he
wishes to take advantage of hard times to make more than legal
interest.... these are cases which counsel ought to hold up in their
proper light to those whom they advise, and wash their hands of the
responsibility of them.
Id. at 113-14. As authority (so to speak) for this position, Sharswood refers to
the sermon on the mount urging people to give others "all that is honestly theirs
as far as you have the ability, whether the law affords them a remedy or not."
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it is not so.
In order to fully understand Sharswood's conception of
the lawyer's role (and his answer to the good lawyer/good
person question), one has to recognize its connection with
the structure and function of government and the meaning
of justice for Sharswood. It was important to have a system
of rules and laws. 8 designed generally to produce impartial
and just results. Because universal agreement about justice
is hard to come by in the concrete (as opposed to the
abstract), affected as it is by our own self-interest and
individual beliefs, In order for the law and rules to operate
properly they can not be subject to individual notions of
justice. " Impartial application of the laws was required for
a properly functioning government."0 The lawyer's role is to
present the client's case diligently"' so the judge or jury can
resolve the dispute appropriately."2  The lawyer is
responsible for presenting the facts and the law and
advocating the client's position "which the client in person,
from want of learning, experience, and address, is unable to
do in a proper manner.""' The lawyer's duty does not
include making ultimate decisions about the merits of a
matter." As agent the lawyer is not morally responsible for
the client's cause, " in part because the duty of zealous
Id. at 114.
108. See SHARSWOOD, supra note 90, at 82.
Law, and justice according to law-this is the only secure principle upon
which the controversies of men can be decided. It is better on the whole
that a few particular cases of hardship and injustice, arising from
defect of evidence or the unbending character of some strict rule of law,
should be endured, than that general insecurity should pervade the
community from the arbitrary discretion of the judge.
Id.
109. See id. ("No court or jury are invested with any arbitrary discretion to
determine a cause according to their mere notions of justice. Such a discretion
vested in any body of men would constitute the most appalling of despotisms.").
110. See id.
111. See id. at 78-80 ("Entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm
zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights, and the exertion of his
utmost learning and ability, these are the higher points, which can only satisfy
the truly conscientious practitioner.").
112. See id. at 84.
113. Id. at 83-84.
114. The attorney's gate keeping function has already been noted. See supra
note 30 and accompanying text.
115. See SHARSWOOD, supra note 90, at 83. Interestingly, Sharswood sets up
his conception of attorney role in response to a common criticism of lawyers
(then and now): that in every dispute there is a right and wrong and in most the
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advocacy is a duty owed to both the court and the client."'
Nor is the lawyer morally responsible for an erroneous
decision made by the judge or jury."'
For Sharswood, substantive justice is achieved
procedurally. The lawyer's duty to the court is procedural,
not substantive. The lawyer has no duty to the court to
obtain the "right" result, truth, or justice. The lawyer's duty
to the court is virtually the same as the duty to the client;
to invoke and protect the client's rights, 8 and to present
the client's case according to the client's lawful instructions.
Notwithstanding Sharswood's language about truth to the
court and the adversary, he understood the lawyer's role to
be that of agent; a conception in which the lawyer's duties
as officer of the court were consistent with duties to clients.
ii. Specific Duties. Sharswood acknowledged that
attorneys owe specific duties to the court, but they are
limited to candor, the avoidance of wrongful conduct, and
respect. Lawyers must not lie to the court:
[A] practitioner ought to be particularly cautious, in all his
dealings with the court, to use no deceit, imposition, or evasion-to
make no statements of fact which he does not know or believe to be
true-to distinguish carefully what lies in his own knowledge from
lawyer knows which side is right, yet the lawyer will maintain "and often with
the appearance of warmth and earnestness," the unjust side. Id. at 81-82. "Is he
not [the lawyer] then a participator in the injustice?" Id. Sharswood's answer:
Now the lawyer is not merely the agent of the party; he is an officer of
the court. The party has a right to have his case decided upon the law
and the evidence, and to have every view presented to the minds of the
judges, which can legitimately bear upon the question. This is the office
which the advocate performs. He is not morally responsible for the act
of the party in maintaining an unjust cause, nor for the error of the
court, if they fall into error, in deciding it in his favor. The court or jury
ought certainly to hear and weigh both sides; and the office of the
counsel is to assist them by doing that, which the client in person, from
want of learning, experience, and address, is unable to do in a proper
manner. The lawyer, who refuses his professional assistance because in
his judgment the case is unjust and indefensible, usurps the functions of
both judge and jury.
Id. at 83-84 (emphasis added).
116. See id. at 83-84.
117. See id.
118. See generally id. at 83. His selection of the Statute of Limitations
defense makes the point. Even though the filing of the action was delayed by
the "indulgence or confidence" of the creditor; the rule of law must prevail, i.e.,
the lawyer can assert the statute of limitations as a defense. Id.
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what he has merely derived from his instructions-to present no
paper-books intentionally garbled.
1 19
Lawyers must show respect to the court, 20 not deceive
the court 21 or the adversary, must not contact the judge122 or
124 * 121jury" without the adversary," argue personal opinions,
urge the jury to violate the law,'2 6 and be honest in dealing
119. Id. at 72 (illustrating his meaning, Sharswood refers to a biography of
Sir Mathew Hale in which it was said that Hale abhorred "those too common
faults of misreciting witnesses, quoting precedents or books falsely, or asserting
anything confidently; by which ignorant juries and weak judges are too often
wrought upon") (quoting G. BURNET, LIFE AND DEATH OF SIR MATHEW HALE 72
(Rothman Reprints, Inc. 1972) (1682)); see also infra notes 164-76 and
accompanying text.
120. SHARSWOOD, supra note 90, at 62 (noting that the importance of
respect, however, did not preclude "firm and decided opposition to the [court's]
views, nay, even manly and open remonstrance; but this duty may be faithfully
performed, and yet that outward respect be preserved .... ."); see also infra
notes 164-76 and accompanying text.
121. See SHARSWOOD, supra note 90, at 72; see also infra notes 166-78 and
accompanying text.
122. See SHARSWOOD, supra note 90, at 66; see also infra notes 166-78 and
accompanying text.
123. See SHARSWOOD, supra note 90, at 68-69; see also infra notes 166-78
and accompanying text.
124. See SHARSWOOD, supra note 90, at 73-74.
It is not only morally wrong but dangerous to mislead an opponent, or
put him on a wrong scent in regard to the case. It would be going too
far to say that it is never advisable to expose the weakness of a client's
cause to an adversary, who may be unscrupulous in taking advantage
of it; but it may be safely said, that he who sits down deliberately to
plot a surprise upon his opponent, and which he knows can succeed
only by its being a surprise, deserves to fall, and in all probability will
fall, into the trap which his own hands have laid.
Id.; cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1958).
125. See SHARSWOOD, supra note 90, at 101 (stating that if lawyer's private
opinion was based on facts not in evidence, it is improper to assert it. Moreover,
such an opinion would rarely be relevant. In this connection, Sharswood
cautions against confusing the role of advocate with moral agent. Falsely
representing belief in the client's cause is immoral because the lawyer sells
himself in addition to expertise. "He makes the moral rule subordinate to the
professional rule. He sells to his client not only his skill and learning, but
himself. He makes it the supreme object of his life to be not a good man, but a
successful lawyer") (quoting 1 WHEWELL'S ELEMENTS OF MORAL AND POLITICAL
SCIENCE 259).
126. See SHARSWOOD, supia note 90, at 70-71 ("It is best for counsel to say in
such cases, where nothing is left by the charge to the jury, that they do not ask
for a verdict. It has a fair candid and manly aspect towards court, jury, opposite
party, and even client.").
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with other lawyers for moral and instrumental reasons.'27
Non-lawyers must, in general, follow the same rules as
lawyers and are also subject to sanctions" The difference,
of course, is that only lawyers can be the subject of
disciplinary proceedings, in addition to the other sanctions.
c. The Turn of the 20th Century. In a section of a 1902
treatise on Agency Law entitled "Duty of Attorney to
Court," the only duties to the court identified are to be
respectful to the judge, adversary, and parties, and to
abstain from the use of abusive language. 9 Grounds for
disbarment included: 3° libel, false claim of authority to
represent, offering to sell information to adversary, felony
conviction, receipt of illegal fees, conviction of subornation
of perjury, falsifying records, stealing records from the
court, swearing falsely, bribing a witness, bringing a gun to
court, threatening a judge, etc.13 1 Virtually all of this
misconduct is against client interests, illegal, or both.
While non-lawyers owe no special duties to the court,
they are also subject to penalty for the same sorts of
misbehavior. 3 2 For example, the use of abusive language
toward the court or other participants in legal proceedings
might well result in a finding of contempt.
1 3
d. Early 20th Century Cases. Commentators arguing
that lawyers have a duty to seek justice role have relied
127. There is a certain instrumental quality to Sharswood's advice; he is
quite conscious of the concept: "What goes around comes around." Indeed, his
unattributed formulation: "Whoso diggeth a pit shall fall therein, and he that
rolleth a stone, it will return upon him." SHARSWOOD, supra note 90, at 74.
128. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1509 (Supp. 1999) (obstruction of court orders); 18
U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. 1999) (contempt); FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a) (contempt); see also
infra notes 149-53, 178 and accompanying text.
129. See GEORGE L. REINHARD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY IN
CONTRAcT AND TORT § 408 (1902) ("An attorney at the bar is under obligations
to deport himself with becoming respect to the court and its officers; and this
duty requires him to refrain from abusive language toward both the court,
counsel and parties.") (citing Redman v. State, 28 Ind. 205 (1867); Dodge v.
State, 140 Ind. 284 (1895); Bauer v. Betz, 99 N.Y. 672 (1885)).
130. See generally In re Wall, 13 Fed. 814 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1882); Ex parte Cole,
1 McCrary 405 (Iowa C.C. 1879); REINHARD, supra note 129, §§ 409-10 (1902)
("The Relation of the Attorney to the Court").
131. See REINHARD, supra note 129, § 410, at 427.
132. Non-lawyers, of course, could not be penalized regarding a license they
do not possess.
133. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. 1999); FED. R. CEIM. P. 42(a).
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upon very scant authority to support their position. Even
these sources offer little or no comfort for the proposition
that lawyers have duties as officers of the court which are
inconsistent with duties to clients, or lawyer liability
greater or different from the responsibilities to the legal
system shouldered by us all.
Advocates of a lawyer role which includes a substantive
duty to seek justice role often point to three judicial
opinions to support their view:
T3
An attorney at law is an officer of the court. The nature of his
obligations is both public and private. His public duty consists in
his obligation to aid the administration of justice; his private duty,
to faithfully, honestly, and conscientiously represent the interests
of his client. In every case that comes to him in his professional
capacity, he must determine wherein lies his obligations to the
public and his obligations to his client, and to discharge this duty
properly requires the exercise of a keen discrimination, and
wherever the duties to his client conflict with those he owes to the
public as an officer of the court in the administration of justice, the
former must yield to the latter. He therefore occupies what may be
deemed a quasi judicial office.135
And:
An attorney owes his first duty to the court. He assumed his
obligations towards it before he ever had a client. His oath
requires him to be absolutely honest even though his client's
interests may seem to require a contrary course. The lawyers
cannot serve two masters; and the one they have undertaken to
serve primarily is the court.
136
Finally, from Chief Justice Cardozo:
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.
(citation omitted). The appellant was received into that ancient
fellowship for something more than private gain. He became an
134. See generally Gaetke, supra note 6 and accompanying text. Most
commentators simply refer to the label "officer of the court" as authority
without any further elaboration. See supra notes 25-27.
135. Langen v. Borkowski, 206 N.W. 181, 190 (Wis. 1925) (emphasis added).
136. In re Integration of Nebraska State Bar Association, 275 N.W. 265, 268
(Neb. 1937) (emphasis added). The question before the court was whether it
should grant a petition submitted by the majority of attorneys in the state for
an integrated Bar. Dealing only with the question of whether the Court had the
power to determine the organization of the Bar, for our purposes, the opinion is
entirely rhetorical. See id.
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officer of the court, and, like the court itself, an instrument of
agency to advance the ends of justice. His co-operation with the
court was due, whenever justice would be imperiled if co-operation
was withheld.... He might be censured, suspended, or disbarred
for 'any conduct prejudicial to the administration ofjustice.'
13 7
The first quotation is from Langen v. Borkowski et al., a
1925 decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court 8' in which
the court explains that the lawyer's status as a "quasi
judicial" officer is limited to the screening function later in
the opinion."9 Lawyers must not "maintain any suit or
proceeding which shall appear to him to be unjust, or to any
defense except such as he believes to be honestly debatable
under the law .... .14o Notably, if in good faith the issue is
"fairly debatable," the lawyer as "officer of the court" must
obey the client's wishes.' Connecting the lawyer's duty to
the client with the lawyers' duty to the administration of
justice, the court concludes that its capacity to function
requires lawyers who are duty bound to their clients.' Far
137. People ex rel Karlin v. Culkin, 162 N.E. 487, 489-90 (N.Y. 1928)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Rubin v. State, 216 N.W. 513
(Wis. 1927) (holding error to review a judgment of the circuit court of
Milwaukee County adjuding Rubin guilty of contempt for refusal to be sworn as
a witness); Ohio Ct. App., 26 Ohio Law Bull. 355, 515.
138. See Langen, 206 N.W. at 186-90 (claiming a variety of wrongs
associated with the judicial process, the plaintiff sued a judge, sheriff, court
clerk, a jailer, and the attorneys representing a party in an underlying landlord-
tenant and property dispute. The doctrine of judicial immunity was found to
apply to the judge and court clerk and neither the sheriff nor the jailer were
liable because the papers on which they were entitled to rely were in order. The
attorney defendants were alleged to have "counseled and instigated to the court
to pursue the unlawful orders" that resulted in plaintiffs' imprisonment. The
court reasoned that the lawyers were not liable because their role in the
administration of justice requires that they have immunity).
139. Id. at 190 ("[In this respect he is called upon to exercise his judgment
in a manner like that exercised by a judicial officer.").
140. Id. (holding that a lawyer is forbidden to: "in bad faith urges... upon
the court the adoption of a legal proposition which is not honestly debatable,
with a view of furthering the interests of his client, [because] he is not aiding,
but thwarting, the administration ofjustice").
141. Id. ("If the issue of liability is one which is fairly debatable, then under
the oath of office of an attorney, he is not only authorized to present and urge
his position upon the court, but in the discharge of his duties toward his client
he must do so... He is duty bound, however, under his oath, to exercise good
faith.").
142. See id. at 191.
It is in the interests of the proper administration ofjustice that counsel
shall be courageous and fearless in the discharge of their duties .... As
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from being inconsistent with being an "officer of the court,"
the lawyers duty to the client is simply part of that duty.
Chief Justice Cardozo's famous statement from People
ex rel Karlin v. Culkin,44 is also often referred to 45 in
support of lawyers' independent duties to the
administration of justice. 6  When this language is
considered in context, it simply does not support the
proposition that lawyers as "officers of the court" have
substantive duties to seek justice that conflict with those
owed clients and that are greater or different than those
duties non-lawyers owe to the legal system. The court was
investigating claims that:
[Elvil practices were rife among members of the bar. "Ambulance
chasing" was spreading to a demoralizing extent. As a
consequence, the poor were oppressed and the ignorant
overreached. Retainers, often on extravagant terms, were solicited
and paid for. Calendars became congested through litigations
maintained without probable cause as weapons of extortion.
Wrongdoing by lawyers for claimants was accompanied by other
wrongdoing, almost as pernicious, by lawyers for defendants. The
helpless and the ignorant were made to throw their rights away as
a result of inadequate settlements or fraudulent releases.1
47
This investigation was obviously designed to benefit
clients. The incidental burdens this investigation imposes
we cannot have a strong court without courageous and fearless judges,
so it is impossible to have a strong bar without courageous and fearless
attorneys. Both operate together... as part ... of the judicial system
to bring about the best results. A client would rapidly lose his faith in
his lawyer if he shrank from assuming a legal attitude on any question
which is legally debatable, and which might have a tendency to bring
about a successful result of the cause.
Id.
143. Not surprisingly, this view is strikingly similar to Sharswood's. See
supra notes 116-22 and accompanying text.
144. 162 N.E. 487, 488-89 (N.Y. 1928).
145. Professor Gaetke and a number of other authorities rely upon this case.
See Gaetke, supra note 6, at 43 n.20.
146. See Karlin, 162 N.E. at 489-90. The Karlin court framed the question
as whether "when evil practices are rife to the dishonor of the profession, [the
lawyer] may not be compelled by rule or order of the court, whose officer he is,
to say what he knows of them, subject to his claim of privilege if the answer will
expose him to punishment for crime." The court held that it had the power to
direct a general inquiry into claims of lawyer misconduct and that lawyers were
required to cooperate. Id.
147. Id. at 468.
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on lawyers as bar members are no different than the duty
shouldered by any testifying witness.'
Other cases state that when the lawyer's duties as an
officer of the court clash with the duty of client loyalty,
lawyers are not immune from the application of the general
law, in particular the law of torts and contracts. 4' The
lawyer's duty of loyalty does not entitle her to keep secret
what the law requires be disclosed, or protect non-
disclosure that is equivalent to misrepresentation.'
Lawyers must "disclose material information when the
nondisclosure amounts to misrepresentation or when
failure to disclose violates discovery rules or other law.""'
This is not to say that an attorney's duty to disclose
material information is always identical to those of non-
lawyers; it is to say that it is almost always so.'52
After critical analysis, it is apparent that Langen and
Karlin are strong endorsements of the lawyer's agency role
in the adversary system. These authorities do not support
the proposition that the lawyer's role as officer of the court
includes a substantive duty to seek justice if that duty is
inconsistent with the duty of loyalty to the client.
e. Formal Rules Governing Attorney Conduct. The codes
of professional responsibility are largely creatures of agency
law.'53 The codes embody core agency principles such as
undivided loyalty to principal,' confidentiality,55 obedience
148. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 (testimony before grand jury).
149. Lawyers can also be subject to Bar discipline. See, e.g., MODEL RULES,
supra note 1, Rule 8.5; Crystal, supra note 42 (collecting and discussing cases);
Perillo, supra note 42.
150. See Crystal, supra note 42, at 1083 (stating that the lawyer's duty of
loyalty to the client and the duty to disclose are compatible because the duty of
loyalty does not shield the lawyer from following the law.).
151. Id. at 1096.
152. See id. (noting that the lawyer's duties of confidentiality are quite
significant and are different than non-lawyers, but agents also have
confidentiality obligations to principals); infra note 258 and accompanying text.
153. See infra Part II.
154. See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 7.1 (requiring that lawyers must
be loyal to their clients); MODEL CODE, supra note 8, DR 5-101-105 (same);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 23, 389-94 (1958) (same); MODEL CODE,
supra note 8, DR 5-10 (insisting that attorneys be free from conflicts); MODEL
RULES, supra note 1, Rule 1.7 (same); Gaetke, supra note 6, at n.67 ("[T]he
restrictions upon lawyer-client conflicts of interest assure clients that they are
represented by lawyers whose objectives are as single-minded as theirs.").
155. See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 1.6(a) (commanding attorneys to
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to the principal's lawful instructions,5 agent discretion in
choosing means to realize the principal's goals,
157
competence,.. candor and independent judgment, 59 and the
general bar prohibiting wrongful conduct.6 The various
ethics codes can be understood as the collective exercise of
the agents' discretion and judgment that implements both
concepts of agency law such as loyalty, and acting or
speaking on behalf of the principal, and speaks to various
public policy issues relevant to the law and legal practice.
There are aspects of the Rules 6' that arguably create
tension between the attorney's duty of loyalty to the client
and the attorney's duties to the courts, although the
significance of that tension is much overstated.6 ' As an
preserve their clients secrets and confidences); MODEL CODE, supra note 8, EC
4-1-4-4, DR 4-101(C)(3).
156. See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 1.2(a) (demanding that an
attorney consult with, and obey, the client regarding lawful goals); MODEL
CODE, supra note 8, EC 7-7 ("[T]he authority to make decisions is exclusively
that of the client and, if made within the framework of the law, such decisions
are binding on his lawyer."); cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14.
157. See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 1.2 (stating that client chooses
objectives and must be consulted regarding means); id. Rule 1.2 cmt. [1] (stating
that ultimate authority to determine purpose of representation is clients who
also has right to consult with lawyer about means and acknowledging that clear
distinction between means and objectives difficult to draw); MODEL CODE, supra
note 8, EC 7-7 (stating that a lawyer makes decisions that do not substantially
prejudice client or affect the merits); id. DR 7-101(B) (1) (stating that "[wihere
permissible" lawyer may waive or fail to assert position of client).
158. The lawyer must be competent, i.e., prepared and possessed of the skill,
and legal knowledge reasonably necessary for the representation. See MODEL
RULES, supra note 1, Rule 1.1; MODEL CODE, supra note 8, EC 6-1 ("Because of
his vital role in the legal process, a lawyer should act with competence and
proper care in representing clients."); id. DR 6-101 ("A lawyer shall not:...
[h]andle a legal matter which he knows or should know that he is not competent
to handle.").
159. See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 2.1 ("[A] lawyer shall exercise
independent professional judgement and render candid advice."); MODEL CODE,
supra note 8, EC 7-8 (stating that lawyer can refer to extra legal factors in
assisting client in reaching decision); id. DR 5-107(B) (stating that a lawyer
shall not permit outside influences, e.g., source of fee, to affect professional
judgment).
160. See infra Part II.
161. See MODEL RULES, supra note 1. Approximately 45 states have adopted
the Model Rules, some with modifications. See MARY C. DALY, PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY: CORPORATE, BUSINESS, AND INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE 1-9 (1998).
For convenience, unless there are important relevant differences, the Model
Rules will be addressed in the text and the corresponding Model Code
provisions will be referenced in the footnotes.
162. A detailed comparison of the ethical rules and agency law is beyond the
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initial matter, one might fairly suppose that the client
wants to win and will want their lawyer to maximize their
chances of winning, but clients have no legitimate or lawful
interest in obtaining their lawyer's assistance in the
commission of illegal conduct."3 The apparent tension
between the lawyer's duties to her clients and duties as an
officer of the court begins with the first paragraph of the
Preamble, entitled "A Lawyer's Responsibilities." The
Preamble identifies three spheres of duties: (1) client
representative, (2) "officer of the legal system," and (3)
"public citizen having special responsibility for the quality
of justice."" The Preamble acknowledges that "[v]irtually
all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between a
lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and
to the lawyer's own interest in remaining an upright person
while earning a satisfactory living."'65 The Preamble is an
excellent example of the rhetoric that has confused the
lawyer role for so long 6 because neither it, nor the
subsequent rules, set forth responsibilities to seek justice
which are seriously in conflict with the lawyer's duty of
loyalty to her client. Most of the provisions in the ethical
rules do not require more of lawyers than the law requires
of us all-obedience.
For example, in court a lawyer shall not make a
material false statement of law or fact16 or offer evidence
scope of this Article.
163. No doubt some clients will want their attorneys to do absolutely
everything-legal or illegal-to win their cause, but most clients will want to
play by the rules. See Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the limits of the Law:
An Exercise in the Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L. J. 1545
(1995).
164. MODEL RULES, supra note 1, preamble.
165. Id. Resolution of these issues is left to the application of "sensitive
professional and moral judgement guided by the principles underlying the
Rules." Id. In the usual case, however, when the opposing party is "well
represented" the lawyer can be a zealous advocate and assume that justice will
result. Id.
166. Yet another example is the 1986 American Bar Association's
Commission on Professionalism report, titled "In the Spirt of Public Service: A
Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism," which asserts that
when there is a conflict between the duty of client loyalty and duty to the court,
"duty to the system of justice must transcend the duty to the client." AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION, IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE
REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 30 (1986). Further perpetuating the
myth, the report urges a greater stress be placed on the officer of the court
aspect of lawyer role. See id. at 13, 28-30.
167. See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 3.3(a)(1), 4.1 (providing that
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known by the lawyer to be false.'68 Attorneys are also
prohibited from aiding and abetting a criminal or
fraudulent act by the client,'69 shall not "unlawfully" tamper
with potential evidence, urge others to do so,'. or falsify
evidence of any type.' The lawyer and and client must obey
court rules and orders.' Lawyers are prohibited from
knowingly assisting or counseling criminal or fraudulent
conduct.' Lawyers may not make misrepresentations.' A
lawyer shall not conceal or knowingly fail to disclose what
is required by law to be revealed.' Similarly, improper
communications between lawyers with judges and
prospective jurors violate the ethical rules.' 6 This conduct is
also proscribed for non-lawyers. '
Disruption of the tribunal is prohibited by the ethical
rules7 . and the law of contempt.' There are special rules
these statements must be made in court); MODEL CODE, supra note 8, DR 7-
102(A)(5).
168. See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 3.3(a)(4) (providing that if the
lawyer subsequently learns that she has offered material false evidence, she
must take "reasonable remedial measures").
169. See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 3.3(a)(2); MODEL CODE, supra
note 8, DR 7-102(B)(1).
170. MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 3.4(a).
171. Id. Rule 3.4(b).
172. See id. Rule 3.4(c); MODEL CODE, supra note 8, DR 7-106(A).
173. See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 1.2(d); MODEL CODE, supra note
8, DR 7-102 (A)(7).
174. See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 4.1(a) (prohibiting "false
statement[s] of material fact or law"); MODEL CODE, supra note 8, DR 7-102(A)
(5). Rule 4.1(b) addresses the issue of omissions or silence, requiring the lawyer
to affirmatively disclose material facts when necessary to prevent the silence
from "assisting a criminal or fraudulent act." MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule
4.1(b); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 348 cmt. c (1958) (noting similarity
to 4.1(b) cmt. 3, stating that a lawyer may be liable for failure to correct
misapprehension); cf. Crystal, supra note 42, at 1096 (discussing tort and
contract consequences applicable to lawyers and non-lawyers).
175. See MODEL CODE, supra note 8, DR 7-102(A)(3) (stating that it is
improper to conceal or fail to disclose when required by law to do so); Crystal,
supra note 42, at 1055 (discussing tort and contract consequences applicable to
lawyers and non-lawyers).
176. See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 3.5(a)(b); MODEL CODE, supra
note 8, DR 7-108(A) (B), DR 7-110(B).
177. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1999) (aiding and abetting); 18 U.S.C. § 1503
(1999) (influencing juror or officer); 18 U.S.C. § 1506 (1999) (theft or record
alteration); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1509 (1999) (obstruction of court orders); 18
U.S.C. § 1512 (1999) (witness tampering); 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(B)) (1999) (same);
18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1999) (false statements under oath in court or ancillary to
court).
178. See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 3.5(c); MODEL CODE, supra note 8,
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for conduct at trial, but they reflect the rules of evidence
and thus are applicable to all. 80 Lawyers.8 and pro se
litigants are bound by the prohibitions against filing suits
or defenses without foundation or for improper purposes. 82
Neither lawyers, agents, clients, or principals are permitted
to engage in, encourage, or assist others to engage in
wrongdoing.
There are, however, rules which arguably impose
special duties upon lawyers that appear to conflict with the
duty of loyalty to the client and with which non-lawyers
may not be required to abide: (1) lawyer's duty to take
"reasonable remedial measures" if she learns that she
presented false evidence," (2) lawyer's duty not to make
public statements that might substantially prejudice the
parties ability to achieve a fair result, 4 (3) the duty in ex
parte proceedings to fully disclose all material
information,' and (4) the duty to disclose relevant legal
DR 7-106(C).
179. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1999); FED. R. CRIM. P. 42.
180. See generally, e.g., FED. R. EvID.; MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule
3.4(e) (stating that reasonable belief that a matter is relevant or that evidence
to support it will be admissible required before alluding to it, statement of
personal opinion improper unless relevant).
181. See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 3.1. The Model Code is similar
but contains three differences, (1) the Code's test of improper conduct is "merely
to harass or maliciously injure," MODEL CODE, supra note 8, DR 7-102(A)(1),
whereas the Rules require that the position "not [be] frivolous." MODEL RULES,
supra note 1, Rule 3.1; (2) the Code's test is subjective in that the lawyer had to
"know" or it had to be "obvious" that the position was frivolous, and (3) the
Rules explicitly permit a lawyer representing a client in a matter which could
result in incarceration to force the other side to establish every element of the
action. See id.; MODEL CODE, supra note 8, DR 7-102(A)(1)(2).
182. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b) ("[An attorney or unrepresented party.");
Lerch v. Boyer, 929 F. Supp. 319 (N.D. Ind. 1996) (holding that Rule 11 is
applicable to pro se litigants).
183. See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 3.3(a)(4).
184. See id. Rule 3.6; MODEL CODE, supra note 8, DR 7-107. One might
contend that public relations is not part of the special expertise the lawyers as
independent contractors offer, it therefore is not is not part of the lawyer's
agency role at all. See generally David A. Strauss, Why It's Not Free Speech
Versus Fair Trial, 1998 U. CIR. LEGAL F. 109 (1998); Gerald F. Uelmen, Leaks,
Gags and Shields: Taking Responsibility, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 943 (1997).
For criticism of Rule 3.6 see Joel H. Swift, Model Rule 3.6: An Unconstitutional
Regulation of Defense Attorney Trial Publicity, 64 B.U. L. REV. 1003 (1984)
(arguing that regulation of defense attorneys is unnecessary and
unconstitutional).
185. See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 3.3(d). The Model Code has no
counterpart.
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authority directly adverse to the client's position.'86
Failure to correct false evidence will likely result in the
wrong outcome; prejudicial public statements will possibly
contaminate prospective fact-finders thus creating a risk of
a wrong result; both the failure to disclose all relevant
information in ex parte proceedings, and failing to alert the
court to directly adverse legal authority could result in the
court deciding incorrectly. These four rules prevent the
lawyer from being involved in wrongdoing, which is an
important component of agency law."'
The observation that avoidance of wrongdoing is
consistent with agency law, however, doesn't answer the
question of whether non-lawyers have similar
responsibilities. In fact, the principles underlying these
rules also apply generally to non-lawyers and provide
sanctions for their violation.'88 Non-lawyers are bound to
correct representations believed to be true when made but
subsequently learned to be false.'89 Those who make false
public statements prejudicial to a fair trial may face a
defamation action and, even if the statements are true, may
be subject to a gag order and consequences for its
violation.9 '
186. See id. Rule 3.3(a)(3); MODEL CODE, supra note 8, DR 7-106(B)(1).
These rules are very limited in application. They require disclosure of "gl1egal
authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to [the lawyer] to be directly
adverse to the position of his client...." Id. The client, of course, might be
better off (at least in the short term) if the lawyer were not required to disclose
directly adverse authority.
187. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 19 (1958).
188. See generally Crystal, supra note 42, at 1055.
189. Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding lawyer
liable for negligent misrepresentation that induced detrimental reliance); Dyke
v. Zaiser, 182 P.2d 344, 351 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947).
[O]ne has a right to rely on statements of material facts essentially
connected with the substance of the transaction where one of the
parties is ignorant or inexperienced in regard to matters concerning
which material representations are made, and such ignorance is known
to the other party, who is also aware that reliance is being placed on
his representations, and that the facts are not, and cannot be expected
to be, within the first party's knowledge.
Id.; see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Lawyer's Obligation to be Trustworthy
when Dealing with Opposing Parties, 33 S.C. L. REV. 181, 189 (1981) ("The law
of fraud as generally understood requires revelation where necessary to correct
a material misstatement when the lawyer has became aware of an inaccuracy.")
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (1976); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 348 (1958).
190. Notwithstanding the prohibition in Rule 3.6(a), a lawyer may
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The rules regarding the full disclosure of relevant
information in ex parte applications and the duty to cite
directly adverse legal authority, at first seem to impose
obligations on attorneys inconsistent with client's interests
and different from the obligations bourne by non-lawyers.
These impositions (if they actually exist) are trivial both in
terms of likely substantive effect on the client and
frequency of occurrence. The test to determine if a non-
lawyer owes a duty different from a lawyer is: Would a pro
se party have to disclose relevant information in an ex parte
application or directly adverse authority known to her? The
cases are legion stating that courts should liberally
construe submissions of non-lawyers representing
themselves, 9' however, statutes, court rules, (and cases
where relevant) generally apply explicitly to attorneys and
parties.
9 2
Applications without notice to one's adversary are
typically made in emergencies to preserve the status quo
and/or prevent irreparable harm. As with virtually all
applications made to courts, ex parte applications require a
statement under oath justifying the relief requested.' 93 In
communicate just about anything to "protect a client from... substantial undue
prejudicial" publicity. See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 3.6(c). For practical
and legal reasons this obligation is exceptionally weak and narrow. As
discussed in Gentile v. Nevada, the First Amendment provides almost total
protection for the attorney's communication, and the chance of demonstrating a
"substantial likelihood of material..." prejudice is quite small. 501 U.S. 1030
(1991). In yet another example of rhetoric without analysis in this area, the
Court said in dicta that attorneys in the criminal justice system had "fiduciary
obligations to the court and the parties," without identifying those
responsibilities or their source. Id. at 1057. Also without elaboration, the Court
opined that the lawyer's public statements might violate "other established
duties." Id. at 1057.
191. See, e.g., Johnson v. Reagan, 524 F.2d 1123, 1124 (9th Cir. 1975);
Gordon v. Crouchley, 554 F. Supp. 796, 797 (D.R.I. 1982) (same); Mobley v.
McCormick, 160 F.R.D. 599, 600 (D. Colo. 1995) (stating that the court should
consider less extreme sanctions than dismissal when litigant appears pro se);
Young v. Corbin, 889 F. Supp. 582, 585 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (explaining that while
Rule 11 applies to pro se parties that status must be considered in determining
whether their conduct was reasonable). The scenario envisioned by this
question, that of the non-attorney pro se party discovering the relevant, directly
adverse authority, and knowingly failing to disclose it, seems unlikely.
192. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a) (requiring that all pleadings, motions,
and other papers must be signed by the attorney, or if unrepresented, by the
party).
193. Under such circumstances, it is extremely likely that a judge would
inquire as to whether there is relevant undisclosed information.
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addition, under some circumstances an undertaking or bond
is mandatory.' The application process for ex parte relief,
therefore, contains some assurances that lawyers and non-
lawyers alike will supply the court with full disclosure or
face ejury sanctions and/or the possibility of financial
loss.' This is separate from, and in addition to, the
attorney's ethical responsibilities.
Can a non-lawyer pro se litigant be penalized for failing
to disclose directly adverse legal authority?'96 Arguably,
knowing silence is the equivalent of misrepresentation.
But even if one concludes that this is a special obligation to
the court not imposed on non-lawyers and inconsistent with
the duty of loyalty to the client,'98 its practical consequences
are few. In many instances, there will be timely discovery of
the directly binding legal authority.
In the end, the one duty to the court imposed on
lawyers inconsistent with the duty of loyalty to the client is
the duty under the Rules to cite directly adverse authority.
The characterization officer of the court is based on little
more than self-serving rhetoric and does not include a
substantive duty to seek justice that is at odds with the
duty of loyalty and zealous advocacy. A lawyer does not
owe the court any duty of consequence greater than the
non-lawyer.
II. AGENCY LAW
The central role of the lawyer is that of agent for
clients. Lawyers speak and act on behalf of and at the
194. See, e.g., Sckolnick v. Harlow, 820 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1987) (directing pro
se plaintiff to post $5000.00 or deed in favor of defendant).
195. In any event, concealment of information is, at best, only in the client's
short-term interest. When the matter is no longer ex parte, the concealed matter
will be disclosed and the court will respond accordingly. Improper concealment
is a basis to reopen settlements and judgments. See generally Crystal, supra
note 42, at 1096 (discussing tort and contract consequences applicable to
lawyers and non-lawyers).
196. The scenario envisioned by this question, that of the non-attorney pro
se party discovering the relevant, directly adverse authority, and knowingly
failing to disclose it, seems unlikely.
197. See generally Crystal, supra note 42, at 1096 (discussing tort and
contract consequences applicable to lawyers and non-lawyers).
198. One might also argue that this rule is bad and should be disregarded.
Attorneys are not required to disclose facts of a similar character which-if the




direction of others. Lawyers provide individuals access to
the law, permit disputes to be resolved according to the law,
and allow individuals to determine their own affairs.'99 This
is the reach, and limit, of the lawyer's role as regards the
supposed conflict between the duty of loyalty to the client
and the duty to seek justice. Claims that lawyers should be
free to disobey the client's lawful instructions must be
scrutinized very carefully, lest the fundamental
characteristic of lawyer role disappear and lawyers assume
the role of judges.
Since ancient Greece, individuals have spoken for, or
acted on behalf, of others at their direction in legal
proceedings. This historical fact should weigh heavily in our
discussion; because if lawyers ought to have a substantive
duty to seek justice, the nonexistence of such a role after
many centuries of lawyering should cause us to proceed
very carefully before adopting such a significant change.
The lack of serious discussion of agency law by
contemporary scholars of professional ethics and roles,"' as
well as its diminishing place in law school curriculums,
inhibits informed analysis and requires the following
discussion.
199. See Pepper, supra note 163, at 1545-46 ("The primary job of the lawyer
is to give the client access to the law in its multitude of facets."); Charles Fried,
The Lawyer as Friend, 80 YALE L. J. 1060, 1073 (1975) (client should be able to
rely on attorney to realize the autonomy the law recognizes); Rob Atkinson,
Beyond the New Role Morality for Lawyers, 51 MD. L. REV. 853, 860 (1992)
("The law does not quite condone the actions that it does not condemn, but in
permitting these actions it expresses a preference for individual autonomy over
collectively defined 'right' behavior.").
200. The volume of scholarship about legal ethics and professional roles has
increased substantially in recent years; however, few commentators write about
agency law. But see Deborah DeMott, The Lawyer as Agent, 67 FoRDHAMI L. REV.
301 (1998) (providing an example of an exception); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,
Lawyer Liability in Third Party Situations: The Meaning of the Kaye Scholer
Case, 26 AKRON L. REV. 395 (1993) (same); Arnold I. Siegel, Abandoning the
Agency Model of the Lawyer-Client Relationship: A New Approach for Deciding
Authority Disputes, 69 NEB. L. REv. 473 (1990) (claiming that the
"substance/procedure" distinction used to decide scope of authority issues is
flawed and recommending a balancing test); Paul R. Tremblay, On Persuasion
and Paternalism: Lawyer Decisionmaking and the Questionably Competent
Client, 31 UTAH L. REV. 515 (1987).
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A. A Short History of the Agency Relation in Legal
Proceedings
1. Introduction. Agents in legal proceedings have
always been required to obey the lawful instructions of
their clients. In ancient Greece, the Roman Empire, and
medieval England there were assistants who spoke or wrote
on behalf of others in their presence, or at their direction. In
the Roman Empire and medieval England, individuals
performed the function of agent in legal proceedings. When
the assistant had the power to act for the client in the
client's absence, the assistant was an agent in the modern
sense. The client's right to appoint an agent was slow to
receive acceptance in part because of the common belief in
early societies that "every man ought to fight his own
battles.""' This belief existed in ancient Greece, °. the early
Roman Empire, ° and in medieval England." ' Because of
this belief, individuals were required to personally appear
and speak for themselves in legal proceedings.0 5 Parties to
legal disputes, however, could, and commonly did, avail
themselves of lay or experienced assistance.0 6 The assistant
performed an advocacy role, speaking on behalf of the
party, in accordance with the party's instructions, and (if
experienced) provided some level of expertise.0 ' The party
could appear with the assistant, but the assistant could not
201. See, e.g., ANTON-HERMAN CHROUST, THE RANKS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION IN ENGLAND 571 (1960) [hereinafter CHROUST, THE RANKS].
202. See also ANTON-HERMAN CHROUST, THE LITIGIOUS ATHENIAN 123 (1998)
[hereinafter CHROUST, LITIGIOUS ATHENIAN] (stating that Greeks "believed that
a man should either fight his own battles or steer clear of them in the first
place.... In this way, he could reestablish his manly reputation by taking
vengeance personally for his opponents slight to his honor").
203. See POUND, supra note 45, at 38.
204. See CHROUST, THE RANKS, supra note 201, at 571.
205. See id.
206. Lay assistance was normally provided by friends or family. See
CHRISTIAN, supra note 44, at 9.
[Ilt appears that attorneys also had ceased to be lay friends casually
assisting in suits and they too had became a professional class. One
passes from the consideration of the origin of that class in the unfeed
assistance of private friends to the century consisted of people who
performed this service with some regularity.
207. See id.
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speak on behalf of the party when the party was absent."8
The assistant had no legal power to bind the party0 9 unless
the party was present and agreed to be bound by the
advocate's statements. Since the party was always present
with the advocate, any deviation from the client's
instruction could be corrected by the party. In early
societies, parties to legal disputes commonly relied upon the
assistance of advocates who performed a role similar to
present day lawyers except for one significant respect: In
the absence of the party, early advocates did not possess the
power to alter the legal relation of that party with respect
to third parties and thus were not agents as defined in
modern terms.21°
2. Representatives in Medieval England. In early
medieval England, parties appeared personally before the
tribunal to plead their own cause;2 1 representation by
another in the absence of the party was permitted only with
royal consent.212 There were, however, "pleaders"2 who
commonly accompanied the litigants and advised and spoke
208. See CHROUST, THE RANKS, supra note 201, at 571.
209. See CHROUST, LITIGIOUS ATHENIAN, supra note 202, at 111.
210. See infra notes 253-58 and accompanying text.
211. See Rose, supra note 43, at 8; see also BRAND, supra note 43, at 3-13;
POUND, supra note 45, at 77 n.1 (noting that the general rule was that a
litigant, in ordinary circumstances, must appear in court); see also Frederic
William Maitland, Legal Reform Under Edward I, in 2 SocIAL ENGLAND 45
(Caswell & Co. 1902) (1894) (indicating that according to Maitland, the rule
requiring personal pleading was also justified on fairness grounds, i.e., the
presence of an expert representing only one side would be unfair); ROBERT
ROBSON, THE ATrORNEY IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND 1-2 (1959)
(explaining that the appointment of an attorney was uncommon because it
conflicted with early notions of the law).
212. See Rose, supra note 43, at 16 (stating that appointment by "royal
prerogative" was replaced by statutory and and judicial authorization); see also
POUND, supra note 45, at 85-86.
213. See Rose, supra note 43, at 20-27 (stating that pleaders were also called
narratores, countors, or serjeants; those performing this role are now called
"barristers." In medieval England there were two other names by which
participants in the legal profession were known: "apprentices," who by the end
of the 13th century were representing clients and practicing law as attorneys,
and Essoiners, whose role was to "appear in court and make excuses ('cast an
ession') for the nonappearance of a party); see also CHRISTIAN, supra note 44, at
4 (noting that for the last 200 plus years in England, attorneys have been
known as solicitors); POUND, supra note 45, at 78-79 (explaining that this
distinction between pleader and attorney mirrors the practice in ancient Rome
where there were advocates and jurisconsults).
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on their behalf.214 Initially, the roles of pleader and
attorney215 were filled by friends and relatives of the party
or litigant.16
During the reigns of Henry III (1216-1272) and Edward
the I (1272-1307), common law courts were formed in which
individuals represented others.217  The rule requiring
personal attendance and pleading by the parties was
gradually relaxed.2 8  Once appointed, an attorney
represented the party as agent and could appear in lieu of
the party.219 In contrast, the pleader or seijeant22 ° spoke on
behalf of the litigant who was before the court, either in
person or by attorney, but did not act as agent and could
not bind their clients. 1
Our modern agency law doctrine is derived from
medieval England. The law of Master and Servant is
hundreds of years old and dealt with servants who
214. See Rose, supra note 43, at 8-9; see also BRAND, supra note 43, at 3, 12;
ROBSON, supra note 211, at 1-2 (stating, while representation by an attorney
was rare, "the assistance of a pleader was commonly allowed and was entirely
in harmony with these ideas"); POUND, supra note 45, at 78-79.
215. See POUND, supra note 45, at 95 (explaining that the word "attorney"
originally meant agent).
216. See Rose, supra note 43, at 9-10 n. 23-31; BRAND, supra note 43, at 10,
46, 69.
217. See POUND, supra note 45, at 78 (stating that the common-law courts
had become well-established before the reign of Edward I); see also Rose, supra
note 43, at 8-9. A confluence of factors actually beginning during the reign of
Henry 11 (1154-89), contributed to the growth of a legal profession. Changes in
the court system included greater national emphasis, the presence of expert
judges, and increased complexity in the litigation process. See id. at 17.
218. See Rose, supra note 43, at 14-15; see also BRAND, supra note 43, at 45;
CHRISTIAN, supra note 44, at 3.
Gradually, then, the rule of personal attendance was relaxed, and the
litigant was allowed to appoint another as his attorney formally to
appear for him and transact matters of routine. He was also permitted
to have a friend to address the Court on his behalf at the trial, he
himself, or his attorney, being present and adopting as his own the
words used by his more fluent or learned friend on his behalf.
Id.
219. See 8 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 222 (1922-
1972) ("The attorney was an agent for purposes of litigation.").
220. See supra notes 49, 213-16.
221. See Rose, supra note 43, at 20-22; see also BRAND, supra note 43, at 87;
SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & WILLIAM MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE
THE TIME OF EDWARD I 195 (1895) ("[T]hese two branches have different roots;
the attorney represent his client, appears in his client's place, while the counter
speaks on behalf of a litigant who is present in court, either in person or by
attorney.").
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performed physical labor over whom the master had broad
control.222 Typically, the label "servant" referred to "wage
labor,"223 commonly manual labor. As early as the middle
ages the term was "frequently applied.., to persons who
did not perform manual labor but who were managerial,
supervisory, or fiscal agents."224 Persons acting as higher
servants "were referred to in the words now used to indicate
particular types of agents, that is, factors, brokers,
attorneys."2" Different roles developed from servant that
allowed one in a "superior [or] ministerial capacity" to
speak and act for another.226 The law governing these
"higher servants" was different from the law controlling the
relationship between "common servants" and their
masters.227 The law regarding "higher servants" became the
basis for modern agency doctrine,228 but because both types
of employees served masters they were both called
servants.
3. Agents in Legal Proceedings in the Roman Empire.
Initially, Roman law did not "have modern ideas of
agency." 30 In early Roman law, the "agent" could not legally
222. See ROBERT J. STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR: THE
EMPLOYMENT RELATION IN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE, 1350-1870
15-54 (1991) (stating that during the period 1350 to 1870, the label "servant"
was used to refer to a wide range employment relations.); see also HAROLD GILL
REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF AGENCY AND
PARTNERSHIP 4 (1979); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY §§ 218, 220
introductory note (1958) (stating that where the actor handles physical property
or engages in physical conduct she is usually considered a servant);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(1)-2(2); WARREN A. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF AGENCY 83(B) (1964). Examples of this type of agent are
household servants and many employees of businesses.
223. STEINFELD, supra note 222, at 17-20.
224. Id. at 18 (noting that in 1765 Blackstone, and in 1816 American Writer
Tapping Reeve, used the phrase "higher servants" to refer to stewards, bailiffs,
and factors; they were relying on common usage that went back to the 13th
century); see WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *415; TAPPING REEVE, LAW
OF BARON AND FEMME 493 (1816).
225. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 218.
226. Id. (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *427).
227. See infra notes 264-65 and accompanying text (describing how the law
differed as between servants and "higher servants," agents and independent
contractors).
228. STEINFELD, supra note 222, at 18.
229. See id. at 19.
230. POUND, supra note 45, at 37-38 ("Roman law, however, did not have
modern ideas of agency."); see J.A. CROOK, LEGAL ADVOCACY IN THE ROMAN
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bind the "principal" directly, and the principal was not
directly legally liable to the agent.231 The agent was
responsible for her own acts; they were not legally viewed
as having been done by the principal.2 2  By special
arrangement, however, the agent was contractually bound
to give any award to his principal; similarly, the principal
was obligated to indemnify the agent for loss and expense.
Eventually Roman law required that judgments be directly
transferred to the appropriate party and "agents for
litigation had become truly attorneys.':
These attorneys, called jurisconsults, 35 played a role
that included contemporary notions of the agent-principal
relation."5 Roman lawyers provided four primary services
for their clients. They "represent[ed] parties in initiating
legal action and in carrying out the various steps in the
complicated legal procedure required prior to the actual
trial, ) 7 "plead the case before the courts on behalf of a
client," 8 answered questions of law including questions of
substance and procedure for private parties and
magistrates, and executed legal documents of all sorts.2 9 By
WORLD 111 (1995) ("Early Roman law lacked modem conceptions of agency.")
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Agency, 4 HARv. L. REv. 345, 350 (1891).
231. See POUND, supra note 45, at 38.
Roman Law, however, did not have modem ideas of agency. What the
agent did was not thought of as done by his principal. As the law saw
it, what the agent did, he did himself. But he was bound contractually
that the benefit of what he did should inure to his principal, and the
principal was bound contractually to indemnify the agent for loss and
expense incurred in his carrying out the agency in good faith.
Id.; see CROOK, supra note 230, at 111.
232. See CROOK, supra note 230, at 111; see also Holmes, supra note 230, at
350.
233. See CROOK, supra note 230, at 111.
234. POUND, supra note 45, at 39 ("Later the simpler device obtained of a
transfer of the judgement to and against the real parties by operation of law.
When this step had been taken, the agents for litigation had become truly
attorneys."); see also CROOK, supra note 230, at 111.
235. See Chroust, The Legal Profession, supra note 67, at 144-45.
[The jurisconsult's] main function was to instruct clients who had the
good sense to call an expert rather than on a charlatan. He advised
them how to draw up a contract or to draft a will in order to produce
the desired results; he instructed them on their legal rights and duties,
and on possible legal remedies.
Id.
236. Cf. CROOK, supra note 230.
237. Chroust, The Legal Profession, supra note 67, at 109.
238. Id.
239. See id.
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the third century, the advocate's role was firmly established
in the Roman legal community, a role separate from that of
a jurisconsult.24°
4. Advocacy in Ancient Greece."4 In ancient Greece,
individuals that provided assistance to parties in legal
proceedings were typically friends or relatives of the
party.141 There were two primary professional roles for
advocacy: "synegeros," and "logographos." One who acted or
spoke on behalf of others was called synegeros.143 During the
Athenian era the term syndic, which came to mean "agent,"
and synegeros, ' 44 were considered to be interchangeable
words. Broken into its etymological roots, syndic means
"one who intervenes in a legal proceeding."246
In ancient Greece, parties in litigation also employed
logographos or speech-writers.247 The logograph was paid to
write a speech on behalf of the client,2 48 who in turn
240. See POUND, supra note 45, at 46 ("By Cicero's time the function of
jurisconsult and that of advocate had begun to be differentiated. It was well
differentiated in the classical period of Roman law from Augustus (emperor B.C.
27 A.D. 14) to Alexander Severus (A.D. 222-235).").
241. My limited purpose in briefly examining the history of ancient Greece
is to demonstrate that a role existed in that society in which individuals spoke
or acted on behalf of others at the other's direction.
242. See POUND, supra note 45, at 31-32; see also FORSYTH, supra note 75.
243. See POUND, supra note 45, at 32; CROOK, supra note 230, at 33 (Crook
defines the "synegoria" as one who simply provided "friendly assistance given
for nothing."); see also id. ("IT]here was nothing to prevent [the litigant] from
being supported and assisted by a cloud of friends or well-wishers, to cheer,
testify or plead on his behalf.").
244. See Pound, supra note 45, at 34 (describing synegeros as "something
very like an advocate").
245. See id.
246. Id. ("There was no clear differentiation of the function of the agent for
litigation from that of the advocate. The word syndic (which came to mean
agent) and synegoros (which denoted something very like an advocate) were
often used as an synonyms. Etymologically, syndic means one who intervenes in
a legal proceeding.").
247. See id. at 32-33.
It was a difficult task for the ordinary man, even at Athens where
citizens were accustomed to public speaking in the political assemblies,
to present one's own case before so large a tribunal, The timid, the
inexperienced, the ignorant were at a great disadvantage before such a
court as compared with trial before a single judge who by questioning
can patiently and skillfully bring out what is to be said on both sides.
Id.
248. See id. at 33-34 ("Above all he had to know how to adapt the speech he
wrote to the age, the condition, and the character of his clients and make it
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memorized it and presented it to the tribunal.249 It was the
logograph's responsibility to know Athenian law and to be
able to fashion an argument that would appeal to the
tribunal.25 In addition, the logograph determined legal
strategy and analyzed the prospective jury to discern their
"passions and prejudices."' These responsibilities are also
central to the modern advocate's tasks. 2
B. Modern Agency Law
An agency relation is created by agreement.253 The
agency relation may also exist by operation of law even in
the absence of the parties' awareness that they even
entered into an agency relationship.254 The principal agrees
that the agent will act on her behalf and with her
permission or at her direction with the power to effect her
legal relations with third parties (within the scope of the
authority conferred).255  The agent agrees to act in
seem to flow naturally from the mouth of the speaker.").
249. See id. at 33; see also CROOK, supra note 230, at 33 (stating that the
logographer might also give advice, act as a solicitor, "coach" one in the art of
speech-giving, or act as a synegeros).
250. See POUND, supra note 45, at 33 (discussing that as with present day
advocates, the logographer's knowledge of the law and the tribunal might lead
to an argument that the law required a particular result for the client or the
argument might urge the tribunal in the direction of sympathy).
251. Id.
252. See id.
253. See F.E. Dowrick, The Relationship of Principal and Agent, 17 MOD. L.
REV. 36 (1954); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 15 (1958); SEAVEY, infra
note 256, §§ 2, 3; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 1, 3B ("The term
'principal' describes one who has permitted or directed another to act for his
benefit and subject to his direction and control. 'Agent' describes a person who
has undertaken to act for another and to be controlled by the other in so
acting."); id. §§ 1 cmt. a, 15.
254. See DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 1.2.4 (1995)
(discussing agency relations, a category of business and interpersonal
relationships, attaches whether the parties had the legal concept in mind and
whether they contemplated the consequences of having the label apply);
LEONARD LAIN & MARTIN SCHIFF, THE LAW OF AGENCY 97 (1996); see also
Dowrick, supra note 253, at 36; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 cmt. b.
255. See Dowrick, supra note 253, at 36 ("The essential characteristic of an
agent is that he is invested with a legal power to alter his principal's legal
relations with third persons: the principal is under a correlative liability to have
legal relations altered."); id. at 37 ("W]hen an agent acts on behalf of his
principal in a legal transaction and uses the principal's name, the result in law
is that the principal's legal position is altered but the agent himself drops out of
the transaction."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 21 cmt. a & b.
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accordance with the highest standards of loyalty.. and
obedience in carrying out the purpose of the agency
relationship.257
All agents are fiduciaries.258 All agents must: (1)
exercise reasonable care and skill in the performance of
their duties,259 (2) act in good faith and with undivided
loyalty,26 ° (3) keep information acquired during the course of
256. See WARREN A. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY §§ 2, 3
(1964) (discussing agency as a fiduciary relation created by law in which the
principal has a right to control the conduct of the agent, and the agent has a
power to affect the legal relations of the principal); DeMott, supra note 200, at
316 (stating that the agent's duty of loyalty can be modified. With the principals
consent, the agent may compete, use confidential information, self-deal, etc.,
however, the essential legal character of the relationship cannot be altered);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 434.
257. See SEAVEY, supra note 256, §§ 2, 3, 3B, at 140 (stating that the duty of
obedience is peculiar to agency law.); see also DENNIS HYNES, AGENCY AND
PARTNERSHIP 203 (1989) (stating that the agent must obey all reasonable
directions from his principal. The duty to obey is unique to agency and
distinguishes the agent from all other fiduciaries. An agent "has no duty to
perform acts which are illegal, unethical or unreasonable, however." (quoting
WILLIAM EDWARD SELL, AGENCY 116 (1975))); King v. Bankerd, 492 A.2d 608,
611 (Md. 1985) (stating that the main duty of agent is loyalty to the interest of
his principal, agent is under duty to serve principal with only principal's
purpose in mind.); Elco Shoe Manufacturers v. Sisk, 183 N.E. 191, 191-92 (N.Y.
1932) (stating that agent must constantly exercise the utmost good faith toward
principal, and act according to the highest and truest moral principles);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 385 (1958).
258. See Dowrick, supra note 253, at 28-32 (stating that the doctrine of
fiduciary responsibilities is historically an extension of the law of trusts and lies
in equity); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13; LEONARD LAKIN & MARTIN
SCHIFF, THE LAW OF AGENCY 11, 97 (1996) (stating that the nature of agency
relationship involves the principal entrusting fortune, reputation, and legal
rights and responsibilities to agent whose actions, for better or worse, vitally
affect the economic well-being and reputation of the principal); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13.
259. See WILLIAM PALEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRINCIPAL AND AGENT §
2 (J.H. Lloyd ed., American ed., 3d London) (1840) (discussing how agent must
"possess such a competent degree of skill and knowledge in his business, as
would, in ordinary cases, be adequate to the accomplishment of the service
undertaken") (quoting Russell v. Palmer, 95 Eng. Rep. 837, 2 Wils. 325 (K.B.
1767))); LAKIN & SCHIFF, supra note 258, at 97; see also SEAVEY, supra note 256,
§§ 140B, 140C; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379. See generally
McCauley v. Georgia Railroad Bank, 157 N.E. 125 (N.Y. 1927) (holding that
agent's failure to exercise care either through inattention or intent to defraud is
a breach of duty); State Auto & Cas. Underwriters v. Salisbury, 494 P. 2d 529
(Utah 1912) (stating that the duty of an agent is to obey instructions of his
principal and exercise reasonable skill and ordinary diligence).
260. See KLEINBERGER, supra note 254, § 4.1.1 (emphasizing that loyalty is a
"hallmark characteristic" of the agency relation. The agent must be selfless,
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employment confidential,26' (4) fully inform the principal as
to all matters relevant to the principal's interest,262 (5) obey
the principal's lawful instructions2 63 (the agent is not bound
to follow instructions if they are illegal or unethical),2  (6)
making dominant the principal's goals and wishes. The agent is only a means to
accomplish the principal's ends); SEAVEY, supra note 256, § 147A ("[W]ithin the
area of his employment and when not acting in the protection of a superior or
equal interest, his duty is to give single-minded attention to the principal's
affairs and to subordinate personal interests, except with the principal's
consent."); id. § 149A (stating that an agent who makes contracts or gives
advice is entitled to be free from pressures and temptations which may lead him
to give less than full-hearted services); Rothschild v. Brookman, 2 Dow. & Cl.
188, 199 (1831); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 380, 387 cmt. b (stating
that the agent is under a duty not to act or speak disloyally in matters
connected with his employment except to protect his own interests or those of
others). See generally Bennett v. Shamilzadeh, 121 N.Y.S.2d 805 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1953) (stating that the duty of an agent is to obey instructions of his principal
and exercise reasonable skill and ordinary diligence); Laub v. Genway Corp., 60
F.R.D. 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Franco v. Stein Steel & Supply Co., 179 S.E.2d 88
(Ga. 1970), cert. denied 402 U.S. 973 (1971); Finnerty v. Frenchman, 118
N.Y.S.2d 790 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1952), modified 283 A.D. 970 (N.Y. App. Div. 1954).
261. See DeMott, supra note 200, at 301 n.51 (stating that an agent must
protect the principal's confidential information from being used in a manner
which benefits others or the agent even after the agency ends. "Confidential
information includes any information that is not generally known and that
either carries economic benefits for the principal, or could, if disclosed,
otherwise damage or embarrass the principal"); KLEINBERGER, supra note 254,
§ 4.1.1, at 124-25 (stating that all confidential information acquired by agent
during the relationship is safeguarded by the duty of nondisclosure and
nonuse); see also SEAVEY, supra note 256, § 152, 249-50; Dowrick, supra note
253, at 39 (citing Lamb v. Evans, 1 Ch. 218. (1893)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 395-96.
262. See LEONARD LAKmN & MARTIN SCHIFF, THE LAW OF AGENCY 99, 101 (2d
ed. 1996) (noting that as part of the duty of loyalty an agent must promptly
inform his or her principal of all information related to the agency relation);
Dowrick, supra note 253, at 39; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381.
263. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 385(1) cmt. a, 385(2)
(recognizing that while "[t]he agent cannot properly refuse to obey on the
ground that the obedience will be injurious to the principal's affairs," customs
including professional ethics will be considered to determine the reasonableness
of the principal's orders); id. § 250 cmt. a (acknowledging that the non-servant
agent agrees sometimes to render services and sometimes to achieve results,
but he does not surrender control over his physical actions. Factors, brokers,
and attorneys at law represent the non-servant type of agents); id. § 383 (noting
that an agent owes a duty to act only in "accordance with the principal's
manifestation of consent" except when privileged to protect the agent's or
another's interest); id. § 14 cmt. a ("The control of the principal does not,
however, include control at every moment; its exercise may be very attenuated,
and as where the principal is physically absent, may be ineffective.").
264. See SEAVEY, supra note 256, § 147, at 243 ("Except in the protection of
superior or equal interests of his own or those of others, an agent has a duty to
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comply with the law, 65 and (7) account for all actions. 6
Nonemployee or independent contractor agents267 are agents
who possess expertise and skill and, therefore, must
exercise judgment and discretion in executing the
act solely for the interests of his principal."); id. § 147A, at 243 ("The public
interest protects an agent from doing an illegal act, whether he agreed to it; he
cannot be required to misrepresent the quality of the goods he is selling."); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 385 cmt. a (providing that an agent
has no duty to perform acts which "are illegal or unethical, such as
misrepresentation as to the qualities of goods sold"); Hunter v. Payne, 184
N.Y.S. 433, 436-37 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1920) affd, Kinneary v. Parrett, 188 N.Y.S.
930 (N.Y. App. Div. 1921) ("An agent is not liable for failing to do what the law
does not permit, and he cannot be held accountable for failure to obey illegal
instructions, or for failure to perform illegal acts"); LAMN, supra note 262, at 98
(agent has no duty to obey instructions which are immoral, illegal, unethical, or
against public policy); DENNIS HYNES, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 203, 231 (3d ed.
1989) (same) (citing SELL, supra note 258, at 116). See generally King v.
Bankerd, 492 A.2d 608 (Md. 1985); KLEINBERGER, supra note 254, § 4.1.3, at
129-30.
265. See LAIN & SCHIFF, supra note 262, at 100 ("It is a fundamental rule of
law that an agent must comply with the law no matter what the principal-agent
contract otherwise provides."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 19.
266. See Dowrick, supra note 253, at 39 (the obligation to account to the
principal also requires that property received from the principal be kept
segregated: "[An agent who receives goods or money from or for his principal is
bound to keep that property separate from his own and that of others"); id at 30
(citing Lupton v. White, 15 Ves. 432 (1808)); Burdick v. Garrick L.R. 5 Oh. 233,
240 (1870); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 382.
267. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14N (stating that an agent not
subject to the physical control of principal is an independent contractor; see also
RUSCHLEIN, supra note 222, § 4, at 10-11, § 6B, at 12-13; RESTATEMENT SECOND
OF AGENCY § 2(3) (independent contractor is the antithesis of servant.); id. §
218; id. § 385 cmt. a (stating that agents who are independent contractors such
as attorneys are typically permitted a significant amount of freedom in
determining how to accomplish the goals of the agency). The factors to be
considered in determining whether an agent is a servant or an independent
contractor are:
(1) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may
exercise over the details of the work; (2) whether or not the one
employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (3) the kind of
occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is
usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist
without supervision; (4) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(5) whether the employer or workman supplies the instrumentalities,
tools and the place of work for the person doing the work; (6) the
method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; ... (7) whether
or not the work is part of the regular business of the employer; (8)
whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of
master and servant; and (9) whether the principal is or is not in the
business.
Id. § 220(2)(a-j).
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principal's instructions.268
C. Lawyer as Agent
Although modern commentators on lawyer role have
largely ignored agency law, 69 authorities writing in the late
19th century and early 20th century viewed agency law as
being at the core of lawyer role and professional ethics."'
"[A]n attorney is one that is set in the turn, stead, orplace
of another"; the term being synonymous with 'agent'."2 The
attorney-client relationship is created in the same way as
all agency relations, by agreement.22 The lawyer, as a
fiduciary, must place the client's interest above all others,
including her own.7  The agent's duty of undivided loyalty.
268. See Dowrick, supra note 253, at 30 ("Agents ... are generally chosen
because the principal... has special confidence in the particular person
selected."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14N cmt. a; REUSCHLEIN &
GREGORY, supra note 222, § 7E, at 16 (stating that attorneys are independent
contractor agents who conduct transactions for principals); SEAVEY, supra note
256, § 3B, at 4 ("Attorneys at law, brokers, factors and auctioneers are special
types of agents."); see also id. § 6B, at 8; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §
14N cmt. a.
269. But see supra note 200.
270. See W.B. HALE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF ATTORNEY AND CLIENT § 1
(1896) ("The relation existing between an attorney and his client is that of
principal and agent."). For more recent authority, see Tremblay, supra note 200,
at 518 n.12.
Fundamentally, a lawyer's authority to act on behalf of a client stems
from her status as the client's agent.... This principle not only
permits courts to hold parties liable for the negligence of their chosen
counsel, but its accompanying effect is to deny the lawyer the power to
act except under delegated authority, either explicit or implicit, from
her principal.
Id.
271. See HALE, supra note 270, § 1 (quoting Co. Litt. 513).
272. Id. § 2; see REINHARD, supra note 129, § 415 ("The relation of attorney
and client, like that of any other principal and agent, generally grows out of a
contract of employment, which is called a retainer.").
273. See Cox v. Sullivan, 7 Ga. 144 (1849) (holding that "[an attorney is
bound to the highest honor and integrity-to the utmost good faith" in all
transactions with his client); HALE, supra note 270, at 5 ("The [attorney client]
relation is a fiduciary one of the closest intimacy and is jealously guarded by the
courts."); REINHARD, supra note 129, § 418, at 435 (recognizing that an attorney
"[1like any other agent... is bound to observe toward his principal, the client,
the utmost good faith; the relation between them is one of the most sacred and
confidential that may exist between one person and another ").
274. According to Sharswood: "[Tihe great duty which the counsel owes to
his client, is an immovable fidelity. Every consideration should induce an
honest and honorable man to regard himself, as far as the cause is concerned,
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requires the lawyer to be free from conflicting allegiances
including self-dealing.275 Lawyers, like other agents, are also
bound by the duty to keep the client's secrets and
confidences."' Like other agents, lawyers have a duty to
exercise reasonable care in the performance of their duties,
be reasonably knowledgeable, skilled,277  and act
assiduously."8
Lawyers use their expertise, judgment, skill, and
discretion to accomplish the goals and objectives set by the
client. 79 At common law, the lawyer had complete control
as completely identified with his client." SHARSWOOD, supra note 90, at 117. But
it was not completely unqualified. See supra note 109; cf. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OFAGENCY § 387 (1958).
275. See generally HALE, supra note 270, § 5, at 16-17; REINHARD, supra note
129, § 418. This obligation, however, can be modified as long as its central
character is retained. See also DeMott, supra note 200, at 317.
[The] relationship between the lawyer and the client is less susceptible
to an agreement that varies the lawyer's duty of loyalty [because] [tihe
lawyer's professional duties cast the lawyer in many respects as the
guardian of the relationship, requiring the lawyer to use reasonable
judgement to identify the client's interests and to educate the client as
a prelude to the client's consent to otherwise problematic conduct. In
contrast, agency law generally does not particularize what should
constitute or precede the principal's agreement and does not require
agents to educate the principal or to assure that the principal fully
understands the import of the agreement"). Professor DeMott does not
provide authority for this distinction. The fiduciary character of the
agency relation would seem to prohibit the agent from knowingly
entering an agreement with a principal who did not understand it.
Id.
276. See HALE, supra note 270, § 15, at 39-43; REINHARD, supra note 129, §
418, at 435-36; see also Mary C. Daly, To Betray Once? To Betray Twice?:
Reflections on Confidentiality, A Guilty Client, an Innocent Condemned Man,
and an Ethics-Seeking Defense Counsel, 29 LOY L.A. L. REv. 1611, 1617 (1996)
(stating that a lawyer's confidentiality obligation is rooted in the fiduciary
duties an agent owes to principal and noting that lawyers have two explicit
sources for this obligation - the ethics rules and the attorney-client privilege -
but they must divulge confidences and secrets if ordered to do so by a court).
Confidential information in possession of other agents can also be protected
from disclosure. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. PRO. 26(c).
277. See generally HALE, supra note 270, § 7, at 13; supra note 261 and
accompanying text for agent's duty of confidentiality.
278. See REINHARD, supra note 129, § 429, at 436 ("As in every other case of
agency, it is the duty of an attorney at law to... pursue the task [of
employment] diligently until completed.").
279. See SEAVEY, supra note 256, at 31.
An attorney-at-law normally has implied authority to use those
procedures in the legal proceeding for which he is employed which
reasonably appear to him to be best adapted to a useful conclusion and
to incur the necessary expense. He has no implied authority to release
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over the conduct of a lawsuit 28 including the power to make
stipulations,28' admit facts,28 waive technical advantages, 3
waive notice, agree to extend time to file papers,285 and to
grant extensions.8' Unless explicitly permitted, the lawyer
does not possess authority to resolve any substantive rights
of the clientY7
The lawyer must be obedient to the client's instructions
regarding goals and objectives. 8
In many things [the lawyer] is bound at his peril to obey
implicitly. Thus, if an attorney is instructed to sue on a
claim placed in his hands, it is not for him to determine as
to the wisdom of such a course: his duty is to obey; and for
failure to do so, he will be liable for any loss the client may
suffer, without regard to whether or not the attorney acted
in good faith and did what he regarded as being in the best
interest of the client.289
Lawyers, like all nonemployee agents, have
considerable discretion in selecting the means with which to
accomplish the client's goals. 90
any substantive right of the client.
Id.
280. See HALE, supra note 270, § 3.
281. See id.
282. See id. § 3 n.42.
283. See id. § 3 n.43.
284. See id. § 3 n.44.
285. See id. § 3 n.49. See generally Fairchild v. Plank, 179 N.W. 64 (Iowa
1920).
286. See Hale, supra note 270, § 3 n.48.
287. See SEAVEY, supra note 256, § 31 ("An attorney-at-law... has no
implied authority to release any substantive right of the client.").
288. See HALE, supra note 270, § 4 ("Except as to matters of minor detail,
and those things about which the attorney possess special and technical
information, it his duty to follow the instructions of his client; and" the failure
do so could result in damages.") (citing Read v. Patterson, 11 Lea 430 (Tenn.
1883); Cox v. Livingston, 2 Watts & Serg. 103 (Pa. 1841)).
In case of doubt, it is the duty of counsel to advise his client what he
believes is the best course to pursue; and if thereupon the client
chooses to disregard the advice and pursue his own course, the
attorney may safely follow the client's instructions, and it is perhaps
safer for him to do so than otherwise.
Id.; see REINHARD, supra note 129, § 421, at 441.
289. REINHARD, supra note 129, § 421 (citations omitted).
290. See id. ("But in the absence of specific instructions, the attorney always
has a wide discretion, and where he acts in good faith and according to what his
judgement dictates as the wisest course to pursue no liability attaches if loss
should ensue.") (citing Webb v. White, 18 Tex. 572 (1857); Morrill v. Graham, 27
Tex. 646 (1864); Bennett v. Phillips, 57 Iowa 174 (1881); Pennington v. Yell, 11
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III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS ANALYSIS
A. The Duty of Obedience is Paramount
If lawyers have a duty to seek justice inconsistent with
duties of loyalty and zealousness to clients, it ought to be
grounded in something more than the discomfort some
commentators feel when the law permits activity that they
find offensive. Because the duty to seek justice cannot be
based in the lawyer's "officer of the court" role, perhaps
another candidate is agency law. After all, it is agreed that
attorneys are agents for most purposes, and agency law
forbids agents from engaging in conduct that is illegal,
unethical, immoral, or against public policy. Moreover,
lawyers as nonemployee agents have the discretion to select
the means to accomplish the client's goals. Can agency law
provide a home for advocates of the duty of lawyers to seek
justice? To answer that question we need to determine
whether lawyer role in an adversary system would admit of
such a duty. Would imposing a duty upon the lawyer to
seek justice be too inconsistent with basic concepts of
agency law to be functional?
The term "illegal" means that an agent may not commit
crime on behalf of her principal. The lawyer's status as
agent does not permit lawyers to commit torts, violate
contract law, or violate any other area of law.29' The term
"illegal" does not provide solace to those who seek to impose
upon lawyers a duty to seek justice. But the terms
"unethical", "immoral", and "against public policy" may hold
more promise.
Unethical conduct seems limited to mis-
Ark. 212, 228 (1850)).
291. See, e.g., Ford v. Wisconsin Real Estate Examining Bd., 179 N.W.2d
786, 792 (Wis. 1970) (holding that an agent cannot violate civil rights statutes
42 U.S.C. § 1982, dicta); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 343 (1958)
(stating that status as agent does not protect agent from tort liability; however,
agent may benefit from privilege of principal); id. § 411 (stating that an agent is
not liable for failing to obey instructions to perform illegal acts). See generally
Munday v. Whissenhunt, 90 N.C. 458 (1882) (holding that an immoral or
iniquitous contract will not be enforced); Crystal, supra note 42; Perillo, supra
note 42; John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on
the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193
(1991).
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representations, 292 self-dealing or other behavior conflicting
with the agent's fiduciary duties. 93 Immoral conduct and
conduct that is against public policy seem limited to
behavior sanctioned by criminal, or quasi criminal, statutes
or regulations. These terms apply to conduct involving
alcohol,294 gambling,295 and prostitution. 6 None of this
conduct is the object of serious interest to those advocating
that the lawyer's role should include a substantive duty to
seek justice.
Agency law, however, can not provide a haven for those
who support a role for lawyers that includes a substantive
duty to seek justice for a more important reason; such a role
is inconsistent with the very concept of an agent. The duty
of obedience is intrinsic to the role of agent. Agents owe the
principal obedience and they are not permitted to act in a
manner that is at odds with the principal's lawful goals. 97
All other fiduciary actors determine the best interests of
their charges and act accordingly.98 Agents, on the other
hand, are different-they ascertain the principal's goals and
act to accomplish them. The agent cannot say, "your goal is
completely lawful and can be attained, but I think it is
unwise or immoral and I will not accomplish it." Of course,
the agent need not accept the employment and can under
certain circumstances terminate the relationship with the
principal.
The same is true for lawyers. A substantive duty to seek
justice, when inconsistent with the client's lawful
instructions, is fundamentally incompatible with the
292. See, e.g., Waggoner v. Western Carolina Pub. Co., 130 S.E. 609 (N.C.
1925) (holding that defendant was liable when agent's fraudulent
representations induced plaintiff to enter contest).
293. Cf. MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rules 1.7-1.10.
294. See, e.g., Arras et al. v. Richardson, 5 N.Y.S. 755 (City Ct. N.Y.,
General Term 1889) (holding that in action against surety on lease, defense was
that premises were leased for "illegal and immoral purposes"; specifically, the
sale of liquor without a license. Because such conduct was criminal, principal
had to be shown to have personal knowledge thereof).
295. In most jurisdictions gambling remains a criminal offence unless
sponsored by the State.
296. Prostitution is a criminal offence in almost every jurisdiction.
297. Gilbert v. Williams, 8 Mass. 51, 51 (1811) ("Whenever an attorney
disobeys the lawful instructions of his client, and a loss ensues, for that loss the
attorney is responsible.").
298. Of course, the beneficiary of the fiduciary's responsibilities may be
consulted and in some cases age and maturity may be especially relevant, but in
the end the fiduciary must determine and act in the best interest.
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attorney's role as agent in the adversary system as we know
it. Imposition of duties that clash with the duty of loyalty to
client-in effect agency duties to the court or justice-would
dramatically redefine the agency concept and lawyer role.
Part of the lawyer's role is providing access to the law by
ensuring that the client's cause is fully developed and
heard.29  This procedural purpose is at the heart of the
lawyer's function in our adversary system, but it arises
from the core agency rule that the agent must be obedient
to the instructions of the principal. The client sets the goals
and the lawyer simply tries to accomplish them.
Following client instructions is central to both lawyer
and agent role, but obedience does not mean that the
lawyer must follow any and all lawful instruction."'
Because of expertise, training, skill, and judgment,0 ' the
lawyer has considerable license in selecting the means to
accomplish the client's goals, subject to only two general
conditions: (1) Lawyers may decline to abide by client
instructions 2 that may interfere with, or do not promote,
299. See Pepper, supra note 163.
300. See Read v. French, 28 N.Y. 285 (1863) ("But a client has no right to
control his attorney in the due and orderly conduct of a suit, and it is his duty to
do what the court would order to be done, though his client instruct him
otherwise.").
301. See Wasserstrom, supra note 19, at 7 (stating that most clients come to
lawyers for the lawyers special competence and skill). See generally
SHARSWOOD, supra note 90.
302. The distinction between means and objectives can be illusive. See
MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 1.2. Consider the following hypothetical:
Suppose the lawyer said to the client: "We have no chance of winning if we do
not call your 86 year old frail and sickly father (who will also be vulnerable on
cross-examination) to testify at trial." If the client responds "Don't call my
father as a witness, I don't want to embarrass him and I'm worried about his
health," has she changed her goals such that the lawyer is obligated to obey? By
insisting that the father not be called, one could say that the client has waived
achievement of her previous goals or changed them. On that view, it is her right
to do so. The lawyer as agent has no right to insist that the witness be called
because victory will vindicate the attorney's values. Alternatively, one could
take the view that selection of witnesses is the means by which the lawyer
attains the client's goals and therefore the decision is the lawyers. This subject
may be further complicated by the nature of the fee arrangement. The
distinction between means and objectives is, however, beyond the scope of this
Article. See generally David B. Wilkins, Do Clients have Ethical Obligations to
Lawyers? Some Lessons from the Diversity Wars, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 855,
875-76 (1998); Robert H. Aronson, An Overview of the Law of Professional
Responsibility: The Rules of Professional Conduct Annotated and Analyzed, 61
WASH. L. REv. 823 (1986).
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accomplishment of the client's goals °3 and (2) decline to
engage in wrongdoing. 4
B. The Duty of Candor
Recognition that lawyers are agents and have no
substantive duty to seek justice does not mean that lawyers
are required to act or advise only in terms of black letter
law.0 5 Notwithstanding the frequent disparaging references
to lawyers as "hired guns," the lawyer as agent also owes
the client the duty of candor. 6 The attorney's counseling
function fully epitomizes this duty of candor.0 7 The
303. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983). Jones is an example of an
agent refusing to follow the principal's instructions because he believed to do so
would make the accomplishment of the principal's goals less likely. Although
agency law is not expressly discussed, the case involves an assigned attorney for
a criminal defendant refusing to follow the client's direction to brief and argue
several issues. The Court held that the Constitution did not require the lawyer
to argue all of the client's points on appeal. The case is complicated by
Constitutional issues, the fact that counsel was assigned rather than retained,
and the obvious consequences of losing for the client. From an agency law
perspective, however, the Court's decision is easier to understand. The
nonemployee agent made a decision based upon his expertise that the
principal's goals were more likely to succeed if the appeal were conducted in a
certain way. Under agency law, the agent had no obligation to follow those
instructions of the principal.
304. See Pepper, supra note 163, at 1545, for a thoughtful discussion on the
scope of wrongdoing; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean
"Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in
American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193 (1991).
305. As noted, the law governing lawyers like everyone is not limited to
conduct exclusively punished by the criminal law.
306. Cf. Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 2.1. In the words of George
Sharswood:
Under all circumstances, the utmost candor should be used towards the
client.... It is fair that he should know it; for he may not choose to
employ a man whose views may operate to check his resorting to all
lawful means to effect success. Besides, most men, when they consult
an attorney, wish a candid opinion; it is what they ask and pay for.
SHARSWOOD, supra note 90, at 107-08.
307. Justice Louis Brandeis's statement: "Advise client what he should
have-not what he wants" is a good example of the duty of candor and
counseling. P. STRUM, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE 40 (Letter to
William H. Dunbar, February 2, 1893) (1984). See generally, Nave v. Baird, 12
Indiana 318 (1859) (holding that an attorney should advise a client to the best
of his judgment, and if the client refuses to follow his advice, counsel is better
off following the client's instruction as far as the rules of law will allow). Cf.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 385 (1958).
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components of this function include dispassion,"8
independence,..9 skill, 310 and judgment. Agents are obligated
to be completely straightforward about the wisdom of the
principal's objectives."' Because of their expertise, this
responsibility fits perfectly within the construct of the agent
as nonemployee agent or independent contractor. Candid
expertise is, after all, the reason the principal seeks an
agent in the first place."'
While it is improper for the lawyer to refuse to attain
the client's lawful objective goal because the lawyer
preferred a different goal, candor and counsel are entirely
consistent with the lawyer's purpose as agent.3 The duty of
candor allows the lawyer to discuss the matter broadly,314
exploring options from many perspectives, however, it does
not permit the imposition of the lawyer's values or morals
on the client.35 Through counseling, therefore, concerns of
"moral activists" about some of the harsher consequences of
the "standard conception" of lawyering may well be
mitigated.1 6
The proposals of the moral activists differ in some
respects, but they share the common view that the lawyer
has the right to refuse to follow the client's lawful
308. See generally BINDER, BERGMAN & PRICE, LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A
CLIENT CENTERED APPROACH (1991) [herinafter BINDER].
309. See id.; see also MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 2.1; MODEL CODE,
supra note 8, DR 5-107(B).
310. See, e.g., BINDER, supra note 308. See generally Stephen Ellmann,
Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717 (1987); ROBERT W. BATRASS,
INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING, AND NEGOTIATION (1990); Robert D. Dinerstein,
Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501
(1990).
311. See In re Loring, 374 A.2d 466, 470 (N.J. 1977) (holding that it is the
attorney's "duty to advise the client fully, frankly, and truthfully of all material
and significant information"); see also Stockton v. Ford, 52 U.S. 232, 247 (1850).
312. See generally SHARSWOOD, supra note 90; Wasserstrom, supra note 19.
313. See generally Pepper, supra note 163, at 1545 (discussing importance of
client autonomy and counseling). Much has been written about the risks of the
lawyer manipulating the client. See BINDER, supra note 308. That subject is,
however, beyond the scope of this article.
314. See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 2.1 (allowing attorney to counsel
regarding legal and "moral, economic, social and political factors); MODEL CODE,
supra note 8, EC 7-8.
315. Much has been written on the dangers of paternalism. See, e.g.,
Wasserstrom, supra note 19.
316. Both terms have been used by David Luban and others in this debate.
See, e.g., Luban, Partisanship, supra note 24. See generally Serena Stier, Legal
Ethics: The Integrity Thesis, 52 OHIO ST. L. J. 551 (1991).
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instructions regarding objectives when the lawyer believes
the objectives are immoral. Proponents of moral activism
have simply ignored or misapprehended the application of
agency law to the lawyer role and grossly exaggerated the
lawyer's role as an "officer of the court." The lawyer's role as
officer of the court does not (and could not) embrace a
substantive duty to seek justice because, as agents, lawyers
owe their clients the duty of obedience.31 Once the lawyer
role permits the lawyer's views about morals and values to
be the basis for refusing to obey lawful client instructions,
the role of lawyer has been transformed from that of agent
to that of judge.
Without seeking to trivialize the discomfort felt by some
commentators and lawyers caused by a conflict between
their morals and obedience to lawful client instructions,
allowing lawyers to act on the own beliefs at the expense of
the client's rights is not the solution. One solution is law
reform. For example, reforming the Statute of Limitations318
and other laws whose applications are perceived by the
moral activists to be unfair would be a great public service
(if you agree). Another answer for lawyers who experience
discomfort is to find positions such as a prosecutor or judge
that are less likely to cause discomfort." ' Finally, perhaps
these individuals should consider another line of work.32
Lawyers should not be allowed to determine for
themselves where justice lies and then impose it on the
client (or withdraw). This would in the words of Judge
Sharswood, be "unjust and indefensible, [and] usurp... the
functions of both judge and jury"32 or in the words of
317. See generally Gaetke, supra note 6; Rhode, supra note 28 (discussing
how some commentators have recognized that the officer of the court
characterization does not contain a substantive duty to seek justice but urge
that substance be placed in it.) As long as lawyers are agents and our system is
adversarial, however, the lawyer cannot play such a substantive role without a
profound change in the lawyer's role as we know it.
318. The Statute of Limitations has been singled out by commentators as
unjust as early as David Hoffman. See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying
text; SHARSWOOD, supra note 90. See generally Simon, supra note 23. Hoffman
and Simon would not assert it, Sharswood would. See id.
319. Cf. Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 26 (using the role of the
prosecutor to illustrate his argument for ethical discretion).
320. Cf Norris v. Lee, No. 93-0441, 1994 WL 143119, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Apr.
15, 1994).
321. See SHARSWOOD, supra note 90, at 83-84. The word "impose" was
chosen specifically to contrast it with the lawyer's counseling responsibilities.
Expertise and judgment are two qualities the client seeks in a lawyer.
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Professor Wasserstrom: "The private judgement of
individual lawyers would in effect be substituted for the
public, institutional judgement of the judge and jury."322
A powerful expression of the lawyer's role as agent in
the adversary system, and the absence of any duty as an
"officer of the court" to seek justice, provides the
fundamental thesis of this Article.323
As professional trial lawyers, hired courtroom gladiators, they
cannot always expect to be favored with heartwarming luxury of
knowing for a fact that their clients are the ones in the right. They
simply get hired to go into court and fight the good fight. That they
might not be on the side of right is no more their concern than that
of a literally hired gun-a soldier of fortune-who finds himself
employed purely for the purpose of waging and winning a war, and
for whom the underlying political and philosophical merits of that
war are of no great concern.... Lawyers serve not as a judge or
jury, but as stewards of their clients cause, and as such, in our
adversary system, they serve a vital purpose, giving litigants the
process that is their due. They need not like the client, or the
client's cause, any more than a surgeon need like the patient or




Historically, lawyers have made important
contributions to society and played prominent roles in
government, but when they represent clients lawyers are
agents. This Article shows the rhetoric surrounding the
label "officer of the court" to be conceptually empty. There is
virtually no significant duty owed by the lawyer to the court
that is both inconsistent with the basic duty of fidelity that
is owed to the client or is different than duties non-lawyers
also owe to the court. Continuing to rely on the lawyer's role
322. Wasserstrom, supra note 19, at 10.
323. The Court's statement is in response to an attorney's request to
withdraw because of concerns about possible witness tampering and the
truthfulness of the client's cause. As so often occurs, the Court drew upon the
"hired gun" metaphor which ignores the lawyer's substantial role as counselor.
324. Norris, 1994 WL 143119, at *1 (emphasis added). Consistent with this
warrior metaphor, the Court observed: "The reality is that the professional
advocate who gets too quickly squeamish at the thought of representing a less
than utterly lustrous cause might wish to consider another line of work." Id. at
*1.
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as an "officer of the court" as support for a substantive duty
to seek justice is a profound self-serving misrepresentation
of lawyer role, that misleads clients, the public, and lawyers
themselves.
This tradition of speaking and acting on behalf, and at
the direction of others in legal proceedings stretches back
from medieval England to ancient Greece and Rome. As
agent, the lawyer is not morally accountable for the merits
of the case. The lawyer as agent has no substantive duty to
seek justice; her duty to the court is entirely procedural and
consistent with duties to the client. For those moral
activists who are uncomfortable with the tension that exists
when there is a difference between what the law allows and
their morality and values the answer is urging law reform
or another occupation. The answer is not for moral activists
to deny clients access to the law, or worse, to substitute
their views of morality in place of the law.
Lawyers are agents and have been so for quite some
time. Lawyers owe a duty of loyalty and obedience to the
client as agents. Lawyers in our adversary system can not
be burdened with special responsibilities to seek justice
that are inconsistent with duties to clients and greater than
those of non-lawyers without profoundly changing the basic
nature of the lawyer's role.
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